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Angry Judges
Terry A. Maroney

65 Vand. L. Rev. 1207 (2012)

Judges get angry. Law, however, is of two minds as to
whether they should; more importantly, it is of two minds as to
whether judges' anger should influence their behavior and
decisionmaking. On the one hand, anger is the quintessentially
judicial emotion. It involves appraisal of wrongdoing,
attributionof blame, and assignment of punishment-precisely
what we ask of judges. On the other, anger is associated with
aggression, impulsivity, and irrationality. Aristotle, through
his concept of virtue, proposed reconciling this conflict by
asking whether a person is angry at the right people, for the
right reasons, and in the right way. Modern affective
psychology, for its part, offers empirical tools with which to
determine whether and when anger conforms to Aristotelian
virtue.
This Article weaves these strands together to propose a
new model of judicial anger: that of the righteously angry
judge. The righteously angry judge is angry for good reasons;
experiences and expresses that anger in a well-regulated
manner; and uses her anger to motivate and carry out the
tasks within her delegated authority. Offering not only the first
comprehensive descriptive account of judicial anger but also
the first theoretical model for how such anger ought to be
evaluated, the Article demonstrates how judicial behavior and
decisionmaking can benefit by harnessing anger-the most
common and potent judicial emotion-in service of
righteousness.
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INTRODUCTION

Judges get angry. They get angry at lawyers. A federal district
judge, for example, gained notoriety by publicly inviting lawyers to a
"kindergarten party" where, he proposed, they would learn how "to
practice law at the level of a first year law student."' They also get
angry at litigants. An "angry" California judge revoked Lindsay
Lohan's probation for failure to take her community service
obligations seriously; 2 a week later, Lohan's father was denied bail by
a "very angry judge" who "read him the riot act" for violating an order
of protection. 3 They even get angry at each other. Chief Judge Edith
Jones of the Fifth Circuit, during an oral argument, slammed her
hand on the bench, told a fellow judge to "shut up," and suggested he
leave the courtroom. 4 Judicial anger is a persistent reality, a regular
feature of judges' emotional diet. The popular website Above the Law
has even given a catchy name to judges' public expressions of anger:
5
"benchslaps."
Legal culture, however, is of two minds about judicial anger.
On the one hand, anger could be called the quintessentially judicial
1.
Morris v. Coker, Nos. A-11-MC--712-SS, A-11-MC-713-SS, A-11-MC-714-SS, A11-MC-715-SS, 2011 WL 3847590, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011).
2.
Bob Tourtellotte, Angry Judge Revokes Lindsay Lohan Probation, REUTERS (Oct. 19,
2011), http:/fblogs.reuters.coni/bob-tourtellotte/.
3.
Kathleen Perricone, Michael Lohan Denied Bail by Angry Judge, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 29, 2011, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-10-29/news/30337909_1_kate-major-michaellohan-angry-judge.
4.
Debra Cassens Weiss, 5th Circuit Oral Arguments Turn Contentious When Chief Judge
Tells Colleague to Shut Up, A.B.A. J., Sept. 26, 2011, http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/5thcircuit oral argumentsturncontentiouswhen chief judgetellscolleagu.
Jones
later apologized for her "intemperate language." Id.
5.
See ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
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emotion. Humans (including judges) feel anger when we perceive that
a rational agent has committed an unwarranted wrongdoing; that
experience of anger generates a desire to affix blame and assign
6
punishment, and facilitates actions necessary to carry out that desire.
This coupling of judgment and action rather precisely describes one
core function of the judge. Indeed, we may expect judges to act as
society's anger surrogates, so as to avoid vigilante action. We often
rely on them to assign blame, frequently task them with assigning
consequences, and always hope they will be motivated to perform
these functions.
On the other hand, anger seems to pose a danger to the
neutral, careful decisionmaking we also expect of judges. Anger is
powerful, and its effects sometimes regrettable; consider the actions of
a Florida judge who, "red faced and yelling," left the bench to
"physically intimidate" an assistant state attorney.7 Anger is the
prototype for the traditional view of emotion-a view strongly
reflected in legal theory-as a savage force that unseats rationality,
distorts judgment, manifests in impulsive aggression, and imperils
social bonds. 8 Indeed, fear of such irrationality led Judge Richard A.
Posner to declare that we ought to "beware... the angry judge!"9
Law's split attitude on judicial anger, then, reflects an inability
to reconcile our valuation of what anger offers with our fear of what it
threatens to take away.
Aristotle counseled that we might reconcile these opposing
impulses by recognizing that anger "may be felt both too much and too
little, and in both cases not well." 10 Rather than categorically
condemning or lauding anger, he urged that we judge anger through
the lens of virtue. Virtue consists of feeling anger "at the right times,
with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the
6.
JAMES R. AVERILL, ANGER AND AGGRESSION: AN ESSAY ON EMOTION 248-49 (1982);
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ANGER: CONSTITUENT AND CONCOMITANT BIOLOGICAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL PROCESSES (Michael Potegal et al. eds., 2010); see infra Parts I.B.,

III.
7.
Rene Stutzman, Judge Shea to Be Reprimanded by Florida Supreme Court for Yelling
at Attorneys, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 1, 2011.
8.
Michael Potegal & Raymond W. Novaco, A Brief History of Anger, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF ANGER, supra note 6, at 9, 15 ("Anger is the prototype for the classical view of
emotions as 'passions' that seize the personality, disturb judgment, alter bodily conditions, and
imperil social interaction."); see also Kathryn Abrams, The Progress of Passion, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1602, 1602 (2002) (describing stark dichotomy between reason and emotion in legal
thought); Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 119 (2006) (same).
9.

RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 110 (2008).

10.

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1106B20, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 958 (R.

McKeon ed., 1941).
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right motive, and in the right way."" To be sure, Aristotle's counsel
was directed to human beings generally and not to judges specifically.
One of the most enduring lessons of the early-twentieth-century legal
realists, though, is that judges are human first. 12 Judges' humanity
properly is regarded as the starting point, and the fact of also being a
judge frames a second-order inquiry as to whether and how the
human phenomena of interest should be molded to suit the judicial
role. 13 At the most basic level, then, the Aristotelian tradition
challenges the traditional legal supposition that anger is a suspect
feature of judicial experience, and a suspect basis for judicial action,
merely because it is an emotion. 14 Rather, it suggests, judicial anger
sometimes is appropriate and sometimes not; the difference resides in
reasons-what the emotion is about-and action-how the emotion is
experienced and expressed.
Modern affective science-that is, the psychological and
neuroscientific study of human emotion' 5-proceeds from the same
theoretical basis and adds empirical substance. Affective science
confirms that emotions are rooted in thoughts, reflect judgments, and
are directed toward objects. 16 Emotions, including anger, can be
evaluated by interrogating the accuracy of, and values behind, those
thoughts and judgments as they relate to those objects. The science
also provides concrete tools with which to discern anger's impact on
thought, behavior, and decisionmaking.17 Those impacts then can be
judged as normatively desirable or not. This inquiry cannot be
undertaken in the abstract; such judgments are highly dependent on
context. Judging is one such context.' 8 The second-order inquiry, then,
is to evaluate anger's impact on behavior and decisionmaking as good
or bad in light of the judicial role. And to do this, we must have an

11. Id.
12. Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 629, 656 (2011) (citing Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 697, 706 (1931)).
13. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
1485, 1489 & n.44 (2011).
14.
See Maroney, supra note 12, at 634-42 (the ideal of emotionless judging has both a long
pedigree and contemporary traction).
15.
See HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003); THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCES (David Sander & Klaus R.

Scherer eds., 2009).
16.

ANDREW ORTONY ET AL., THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS (1988); Maroney,

supra note 12, at 643-45 (citing, inter alia, MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT
(2001)).
17. Maroney, supra note 12, at 644-48.
18. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1514.
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idea of what we want that behavior and decisionmaking to look likeand why.
This Article weaves together these philosophical, psychological,
and jurisprudential strands to create an account of judicial anger-one
that can break the present stalemate in which we simultaneously, but
without an explanatory theory, welcome and reject such anger.
Interdisciplinary analysis reveals tools by which we may evaluate
specific iterations of judicial anger as justified or not, and its
behavioral and decisional impacts as desirable (or tolerable) or not.
This Article proposes that those who are angry for the right reasons,
and in the right way, be thought of as righteously angry judges.
By proposing this new model, this Article furthers important
debates on judicial behavior. First, it builds on a growing scholarship
examining judicial emotion. Such scholarship-spearheaded most
recently by this author, but also encompassing work by the Hon.
Richard A. Posner, 19 the Hon. William J. Brennan, 20 and the earlytwentieth-century legal realists 2 1-seeks both to expose the reality
that judges experience emotion and to interrogate how such emotion
does, and should, influence their judging. In prior work, this author
has sought to build a theoretical base for that project, to use cuttingedge empiricism to give it substance, and to articulate a normative
frame within which to judge it.22 This Article is the third in that
series. Such scholarship fills a gap in the psychological study of
23
judging, which historically has left aside questions of emotion. It
similarly furthers the behavioral law and economics project, which
explores the myriad of ways in which judges' human attributes
24
influence their decisions.
Second, whereas prior scholarship has tended to treat judicial
emotion as a general category, this Article focuses exclusively on one
emotion: anger. It therefore brings the analysis to a new level of

19.

POSNER, supra note 9; RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY (2001).

20. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of Law," 10 CARDOzO L.
REV. 3 (1988).
21.

JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).

22. Maroney, supra note 12; Maroney, supra note 13. Going forward, the series will include
explorations of judicial temperament; emotion, gender, and the female judge; and the impact of
the diverse settings in which judges work (e.g., appellate versus trial dockets, family versus
criminal court). The project, currently devoted to constructing a theory of judicial emotion,
eventually will include an empirical component.
23. David Klein, Introduction to THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, at xv
(David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010) (stating that emotion is an important but
understudied "area of inquiry for students of judges").
24. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1492 nn.36-38 (citing, inter alia, Klein, supra note 23, at
xv; W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 36 (1999)).
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particularity. Such a deliberately narrow focus has been productively
applied to other questions of law and emotion; consider, for example,
recent work on regret and abortion rights,25 as well as the relevance of
happiness to regulatory law. 26 The narrower focus allows for a sharper
image.
Third, this Article promises to have real-world impact. Judging
the propriety of instances of judicial anger is a regular feature of the
case law, and thus is important doctrinally. 2 7 The model proposed
herein demonstrates how a previously undertheorized-or, one might
less charitably say, sloppy-area of law can be afforded greater rigor.
Judges, too, stand to benefit. Just as medical professionals
increasingly are taking note of the emotional aspects of their work,
attending to which improves job satisfaction and performance, judges
are poised to begin doing the same. 28 This author's prior work has
sparked that development; 29 this Article will further it. Developing
judicial awareness of anger and the ways in which it can be managed
is particularly critical given the frequency with which angry judges
30
are accused of bias and misconduct.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly encapsulates this
author's prior work showing that judicial emotion is both inevitable

25. Chris Guthrie, Carhart, ConstitutionalRights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 S. CAL.
L. REV. 877 (2008).
26. John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583 (2010); see also John
Bronsteen et al., Happinessand Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009).
27. See infra Part II (discussing doctrinal treatment of judicial anger episodes).
28. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1517-19 (drawing parallel to the medical profession's move
toward emotional engagement); see also Leeat Granek, When Doctors Grieve, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2012, at SR12 (describing study showing that oncologists are inadequately prepared to cope
with emotional demands of job, with concrete impacts on quality of care).
29. Since the publication of Emotional Regulation, this author has been approached with
requests to work with judges to develop judicial training around issues of emotion, both in the
United States and elsewhere. One such training is now being planned, for example, with the
Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature in Paris.
30. See, e.g., Lynda Cohen, Atlantic County Superior Court Judge-Accused of Screaming
at a Woman During a Custody Hearing-Apologizes but Denies Ethics Violation, PRESS OF
ATLANTIC CITY, Sept. 4, 2010, http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/breaking/articleb22e6be8-b755-lldf-bOal-001cc4c03286.html;
Lise Olsen, Secrecy May Help Misbehaving
Dec.
14,
2009,
http://www.chron.com/news/houstonJudges,
HOUSTON
CHRON.,
(federal judge drew
texas/article/Secrecy-may-help-protect-misbehaving-judges-1737681.php
complaints about "bursts of temper" for years before "alcohol, emotional and judgment problems
landed him behind bars"); Kerri Rempp, Neb. Judge Reprimanded for Behavior in Custody Case,
RAPID CITY J., June 14, 2010, http://rapidcityjournal.com/news/article_57599ddc-77b3-1ldf-bec2001cc4c03286.html (stating that a judge was censured for "angry and condescending tone and
demeanor"); Robert H. Tembeckjian, Op-Ed., How Judges Hide from Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 2005, at 25(L) (stating that the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct "censured a
Brooklyn Criminal Court judge for coming off the bench in unprovoked anger and grabbing and
screaming at a defense lawyer").
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and not necessarily-or even usually-a bad thing. Judges are human,
and emotion is central to human life: it reflects a rational assessment
of the world, motivates action, and enables reason. The emotionless
judge is a dangerous myth. But though judicial emotion cannot be
eliminated, it can be well regulated. The Part briefly distinguishes
between regulation efforts that are counterproductive and those that
help a judge steer the correct emotional course. It then moves from
emotion in general to anger specifically. It presents a summary of that
emotion and its core attributes, engaging first with the ancient
philosophical debate over whether anger ever is justifiable, and (after
answering in the affirmative) outlining the physical and psychological
effects with which it is associated. Finally, it explains that, among the
emotions judges are likely to feel in the course of their work, anger is
the most visible and readily identified.
Part II demonstrates the reality of judicial anger. It scours case
law, news reports, new-media sources such as YouTube, and judges'
self-reports to discern both the common objects of, and reasons for,
judicial anger. Angry judges' most frequent targets are lawyers, who
occupy first place by a considerable distance. Following lawyers are
litigants, witnesses, and-perhaps surprisingly-other judges. The
most common prompts for such anger are incompetence, disrespect,
unwarranted harm inflicted on others, and lies. Judicial anger is not
unusual and is not the mark of a "bad judge." However, particular
judges appear to have more difficulty than others in handling anger.
Though the Article does not attempt to analyze the psychological
makeup of individual judges, the findings of this Part suggest that
certain judges seem prone to anger states that are relatively frequent
31
and extreme.

31. This sort of judge-some of whom are mentioned in this Article-will be analyzed in
greater depth in the next article in this series, focusing on judicial temperament. Temperament
is notoriously ill-defined, though all appear to concur that (whatever it is) it is extremely
important. I anticipate proposing that lack of a proper judicial temperament should be
understood to consist of poor emotion-regulation skills in persons with high levels of trait anger.
It is worth noting here that, while complaints about temperament usually focus on behavior
in the professional setting, expressions of anger in a judge's personal life sometimes spark debate
over fitness to serve. For example, Judge William Adams of Texas is under fire because his
daughter posted to YouTube a video of him angrily beating her eight years earlier. The beating
was a punishment for illegally downloading files to her computer. The incident received
widespread press coverage, and many people have called for Adams to be removed from the
bench. See Melissa Bell, Hillary Adams Hopes Father, Judge William Adams, Will Repent After
She Posted Violent YouTube Video, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/blogpost/postfhillary-adams-says-she-posted-violent-youtube-video-in-hopes-her-fatherjudge-william-adams-would-repent/2011/ll1/03/gIQAjoZliM.blog.html (describing popular outcry
and official investigation after video went "viral" and daughter appeared on the Today show).
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Having shown judicial anger as it is, Part III takes on the issue
of how it ought to be. It presents a new theoretical model, that of the
righteously angry judge. It begins by noting that the audience to
judicial anger (whether the public, members of the media, or
reviewing courts) tends to evaluate the propriety of anger states along
two axes. The first is justification, or the reasons for the anger; the
second is manifestation, or the manner in which it is experienced and
expressed. The Part deepens the analysis of those two axes, which it
positions as the core components of righteousness.
Focusing first on justification, it argues that anger can be a
legitimate judicial experience, and a legitimate basis for judicial
action, with the threshold condition being that it rest on good reasons.
A reason is "good" if its premises are factually accurate, if it is
relevant to an issue properly before the judge, and if it reflects good
values. The Part then uses concrete examples to show how good and
bad reasons can be distinguished. For example, it demonstrates that,
when commingled with contempt, judicial anger conveys a belief in the
judge's superiority. 32 Because judges in a democratic society have no
claim to superiority, but only to authority, such anger reflects a
fundamentally bad judicial value.
Good reasons are the threshold condition; however, judges'
anger also must manifest in an acceptable way. Judicial anger
manifestation embraces both the judge's own experience of anger and
the way in which she expresses that anger to others. In its focus on
manifestation, the Part transitions from philosophy to affective
science, using that science to explain anger's impact on behavior.
Anger, it shows, has distinct effects on the processes and outcomes of
decisionmaking-for example, a tendency to spur quick decisions that
rely on heuristics. It also is associated with distinct modes of
expression-for example, a tendency to spur physical approach. Again
using concrete examples, the Part demonstrates how judicial anger is,
and ought to be, experienced and expressed. Importantly, it also shows
how emotion-regulation skills-the tools we use to shape what
33
emotions we have, when we have them, and how we express them can help judges manifest anger so as to maximize its benefits and
minimize its dangers.

32. Paul Ekman, Antecedent Events and Emotion Metaphors, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION:
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 146, 147 (Paul Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994) (defining
contempt as "feeling morally superior to someone").
33. James J. Gross, Antecedent- and Response-Focused Emotion Regulation: Divergent
Consequences for Experience, Expression, and Physiology, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
224, 224 (1998).
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The Part concludes by encapsulating the new model. The
righteously angry judge is angry for good reasons, experiences and
expresses that anger in a well-regulated manner, and uses her anger
to motivate and carry out the tasks within her authority. Righteously
angry judges deserve not our condemnation but our approval.
I. JUDICIAL EMOTION AND ANGER
Before analyzing how and why judges get angry, it is important
first to establish why judicial emotion warrants our attention; what is
special about anger; and how anger can be identified.
A. JudicialEmotion: Its Inevitability and Potential Utility
The standard legal story is that judges ought to be-and are
capable of being-emotionless. As I have explained elsewhere, since
the time of the Enlightenment ideas of the "good judge" have included
the command that such a judge be "divested of all fear, anger, hatred,
love, and compassion." 34 Over the course of the last century, this
tenet of Western
fundamental
a
considered
ideal-once
jurisprudence 35-has been somewhat moderated. Few today would
experience emotion, and
dispute that judges are human, that humans
36
emotion.
experience
that judges therefore
However, our legal culture continues to insist that such judicial
emotion be tightly controlled. Justice Sotomayor reflected the nowprevailing view when she testified at her 2009 confirmation hearings,
'"We're not robots [who] listen to evidence and don't have feelings. We
have to recognize those feelings and put them aside."37 Under this
postrealist account, judicial emotion is to be temporally isolated-that
is, experienced only at a predecisional moment-and operationally
neutered-that is, disabled from exerting any effects on behavior and
decisionmaking. 38 At critical moments of deliberation and action, the
judge is still expected to be emotionless.

34. Maroney, supra note 12, at 630-31 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 203 (A.R.
Waller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651)).
35. Karl Georg Wurzl, Methods of Juridical Thinking (1904), reprinted in SCIENCE OF
LEGAL METHOD: SELECT ESSAYS 298 (Ernest Bruncken & Layton B. Register trans., 1917).
36. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1487.
37. Id. at 1483 (quoting Andrew Malcolm, Sotomayor Hearings: The Complete Transcript,
Part 1, TOP OF THE TICKET (July 14, 2009, 9:57 AM), http://atimesblogs.latimes.com/washington
/2009/07/sonia- sotomayor-hearing-transcript.html.).
38. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1488-89 (tracing the evolution of thought on judicial
emotion).
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Even this moderated adherence to the ideal of emotionless
judging is profoundly out of step with reality, for two reasons. First,
even were it achievable, emotionlessness is not always a worthy goal,
even for judges. 39 Second, emotion generally cannot be eliminated; it
40
can only be regulated.
A foundational tenet of modern psychology is that emotions are
critical to human flourishing. 41 Emotions rest on thoughts: they reflect
our evaluations of events in the world and the relationship of those
events to our goals and values. 42 Emotions thus reflect reasons. They
also motivate action in service of reasons. An emotion signals that an
event is of particular importance, facilitates responsive behavior, and
can signal our needs to others. 43 Emotion also is critical to substantive
rationality, particularly the ability to make social judgments, choices
regarding one's own welfare, and moral decisions. 44 These concepts
find further intellectual backing in philosophical accounts. 45 Emotion
and cognition both contribute to rationality, just as both emotional
and cognitive dysfunction can detract from it.46
Were judges truly to suppress all emotion, then, they would
lose something of importance. They would lose an important source of
engagement with, and commitment to, the reality of their work. An
Australian magistrate, for example, has expressed that a judge who
loses contact with "that feeling for humanity," reflected in emotion,
cannot do her job. 47 Judge Mark Bennett, in a rare instance of public
self-disclosure, offers a similar assessment:
Early in my second year as a judge I had a discussion about sentencing with a mentor
judge . . . . I told him of the extraordinary difficulty and emotional toll I was
encountering in sentencing. He said, "Don't worry, Mark, it will get much easier." Out of

39.
THEORY,
40.
41.

Maroney, supra note 12, at 668-71 (citing, inter alia, POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL
supra note 19, at 228, 242).
See generally Maroney, supra note 13.
Maroney, supra note 12, at 645 (citing, inter alia, JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL

BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 37-72 (1996)) (noting consensus

that "emotions are evolved mechanisms for maximizing survival chances").
42. See, e.g., Richard S. Lazarus, The Cognition-Emotion Debate: A Bit of History, in
HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION 3, 3 (Tim Dalgleish & Mick J. Power eds., 1999); Klaus
R. Scherer, Appraisal Theory, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION, supra, at 637-63. For
more in-depth explanation of this fundamental aspect of emotion theory, see Maroney, supra
note 12, at 642-44, and Maroney, supra note 13, at 1501-03.
43. Maroney, supra note 12, at 644-45; Maroney, supra note 13, at 1502.
44. Maroney, supra note 12, at 645-48.
45. Id. at 647-48.
46. Id. at 646-48; see also Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, 'Rational
Understanding,"and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375 (2006).
47. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1496 (citing Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack,
Magistrates'EverydayWork and Emotional Labour, 32 J.L. & SOC'Y 590, 612 (2005)).
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of their
respect, I did not respond, but I said to myself, if it gets easy to deprive someone
48
liberty please shoot me. I have not been shot, and it hasn't gotten any easier.

As one commentator noted during the public debate over judicial
"empathy" prompted by the nomination of Justice Sotomayor, without
49
emotions judges "don't know how much anything is worth.
Though complete suppression of judges' emotions is not a
worthy goal, regulation of those emotions is.50 Like all humans, judges
can (and do) exert energy to shape what emotions they have, when
they have them, and how those emotions are experienced and
expressed. 51 The innate human capacity for regulation allows us
continually to try and steer the emotional course best suited to the
situation at hand.5 2 This Article delves more deeply into judicial anger
regulation at a later juncture. 53 For present purposes, it is sufficient to
note that suppression and denial-efforts simply not to feel what one
wants not to feel, or to pretend one is not feeling it-tend to be highly
counterproductive, especially for judges. 54 This is as true for anger as
for other emotions. In contrast, recognizing and engaging with
emotion allows judges to rethink, change, or accept it. 55 Engagement
strategies provide the greatest hope for helping judges maintain
access to emotion in a way that furthers, not hinders, job
56
performance.
These propositions together suggest that judicial emotion,
including anger, is inevitable; that at best it can be managed, not
eliminated; and that such management need not have the invariant
goal of utmost minimization, because judicial emotion might
sometimes be appropriate, even valuable.

48. Mark W. Bennett, Heartstrings or Heartburn: A Federal Judge's Musings on
Defendants'Right and Rite of Allocution, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2011, at 26 n.1.
49. David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Empathy Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A25.
50. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1498 ("Literal absence of emotion cannot.., be the desired
end of [the] regulatory effort.").
51. Id. at 1486 (citing James J. Gross & Ross A. Thompson, Emotion Regulation:
Conceptual Foundations, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION 3, 7-8 (James J. Gross ed.,
2007)).
52. Id. at 1500 (citing, inter alia, DANIEL M. WEGNER, WHITE BEARS AND OTHER
UNWANTED THOUGHTS: SUPPRESSION, OBSESSION, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MENTAL CONTROL

122-24 (1989)).
See infra Part III.B.
53.
54. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1532-50.
55. Id. at 1509-27.
56. Id. at 1550-51.
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B. Anger: A Summary
We now turn to the specific case of anger.57 Anger is a
complicated emotion, but one about whose basic properties
philosophers and psychologists agree. 58 Anger consistently is
associated with a sense that the self, or someone or something one
cares about, has been offended or injured, coupled with a belief that
another person was responsible. 59 The responsible person must
appear to have acted culpably, either because she intended to harm or
was neglectful where care was warranted. 60 To experience anger-as
opposed to, say, despair-in response to such a trigger, one generally
also holds some sense of being able to influence the situation or cope
with it.6 1 Change any one of these components and you change the
emotion. For example, if one perceives herself to be the responsible
agent, she will feel guilt or shame; if a situation (say, a devastating
earthquake), not a person, is responsible, she generally will feel

57. See, e.g.,
note 42, at 411,
distinguished); cf.
SCI. 28, 29 (2006).
58. Jennifer

Leonard Berkowitz, Anger, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION, supra
418 (discussing theoretical debate over how cleanly emotions can be
Lisa Feldman Barrett, Are Emotions Natural Kinds?, 1 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL.
S. Lerner & Larissa Z. Tiedens, Portraitof the Angry Decision Maker: How

Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger's Influence on Cognition, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 115,
117 (2006) (a "remarkably consistent picture of anger emerges" from the psychological literature:
anger is "associated with a sense that the self (or someone the self cares about) has been offended
or injured," a "sense of certainty.., about what has happened" and "what the cause of the event
was . . .that another person . . . was responsible," and that "the self can still influence the

situation" or has the "power or ability to cope" with it).
59.

RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 222-25 (1991) (anger supposes an

external human agent who ought to be held accountable); Berkowitz, supra note 57, at 415-16
("appraisal conceptions" of anger locate the emotion in an appraisal of "offense or mistreatment,"

and "disapproval of someone's blameworthy action"); Paul M. Litvak et al., Fuel in the Fire:How
Anger Impacts Judgment and Decision-Making, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ANGER, supra
note 6, at 287, 291; see also Paul Ekman, Facial Expressions, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND
EMOTION, supra note 42, at 301, 318 ("The specific event which gets an American angry may be
different from what gets a Samoan angry" because what one "finds provocative, insulting or

frustrating may not be the same across or within cultures," but the core "theme will be the
same.").
60. This component of anger, central to many philosophical and psychological accounts,
likely applies only to the anger of older children and adults. See Nancy L. Stein & Linda J.
Levine, The Early Emergence of Emotional Understanding and Appraisal: Implications for
Theories of Development, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION, supra note 42, at 383, 395

("[W]ith increasing age, children become ...more likely to respond with anger when harm is
intentionally caused by another person."). Further, children and adults sometimes respond with
anger to situations caused by no culpable agent, such as when they experience pain. See
AVERILL, supra note 6, at 127-46; Stein & Levine, supra (acknowledging such "irrational" anger,
which may be more properly understood as distress that primes one to interpret other stimuli as
angering).
61. LAZARUS, supra note 59.
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sadness; and if she has no power to influence or cope with the
62
situation, she likely will feel fear and anxiety.
This Section begins by engaging with the ancient debate,
relevant to our contemporary one, over anger's justification. It then
presents a brief overview of how anger is experienced and expressed.
1. Justifying Anger
An important threshold question is whether anger ever can be
justified. Contemporary ambivalence on this question reflects longstanding philosophical and theological debates. The anti-anger
position is associated with Seneca, considered the greatest of the
Roman Stoics, and the opposing one with Aristotle. 63 Seneca and
Aristotle agreed on a number of fundamental principles, such as the
fact that anger is directed at persons who culpably have inflicted harm
on someone or something within one's zone of care, 64 and that it
6
predisposes one to pursue punishment or correction of the wrong.
They agreed, further, that making such a complex evaluative
62. Id.; see also Berkowitz, supra note 57, at 415 (in differentiating emotions,
"interpretation of the cause" is "vital"); id. at 417 (citing N.L. Stein & L.J. Levine, Making Sense
Out of Emotion, in PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO EMOTION 45-73 (N.L. Stein et al. eds., 1990))
(if a person believes the situation cannot be remedied, she is more likely to be sad). In
psychology, these underlying reasons are referred to as the emotion's "appraisal" structure.
PAULA M. NIEDENTHAL ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION: INTERPERSONAL, EXPERIENTIAL, AND
COGNITIVE APPROACHES 13-17 (2006) (examining cognitive appraisal theories); NUSSBAUM,
supra note 16, at 19-79, 139-69; Klaus R. Scherer, Evidence for Both Universality and Cultural
Specificity of Emotion Elicitation,in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS, supra

note 32, at 172, 179-234.
63.

AVERILL, supra note 6, at 74. Seneca's actual opposite might have been Lacantius, who

argued "that anger was given by God for the protection of humankind." Id. at 75-76. Aristotle's
more nuanced position has unquestionably been more influential, however, and is more often
offered as the relevant contrast.
64. I coin the term "zone of care" to encompass all persons on whose behalf one might
properly be angry. See ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 253 (1990) (though Aristotle defined anger as an injury to

oneself or one's friends, it is possible to broaden the concept to all those about whom one is
motivated to care, and with whom one can find a way to empathize).
65. AVERILL, supra note 6, at 74; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 29 (anger requires
this set of beliefs: "that some damage has occurred to me or to something or someone close to me;
that the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was done by someone; probably, that it was
done willingly"). Aristotle and the other Greek philosophers developed a sophisticated taxonomy
of anger terms, including menis (wrath), chalepaino (annoyance), kotos (resentment), cholos
(bitterness or bile), thumos (zeal), and orgi (intense anger). AVERILL, supra note 6, at 80; Potegal
& Novaco, supra note 8, at 13-14. Philosophers and psychologists sometimes contest whether
one can be angry only at another human, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 130 n.95, but most
agree that anger at a nonhuman requires anthropomorphizing. AVERILL, supra note 6, at 95
("[W]e all sometimes become angry at inanimate objects, and at events that are justified and/or
beyond anyone's control. But in such circumstances we also typically feel somewhat foolish and
embarrassed about our own anger. Hence, the exceptions tend to prove (test) the rule.").
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judgment requires the exercise of reason. 66 Where they parted ways
was on the fundamental question of whether anger always is
destructive or sometimes is productive.
Seneca laid out his position in De Ira, the first known work
devoted entirely to anger. 67 For Seneca, anger's dependence on reason
did not redeem the emotion, for he believed it to be grounded in the
wrong use of reason. First, Seneca advocated that the cognitive
judgments underlying anger represent false valuations of the world
and one's place in it. Affronts to one's pride, for example, should not
arouse anger, because one should not be prideful. 68 Second, Seneca
argued that the thinking underlying anger necessarily reflects illogic
and weakness. 69 Third, he posited that anger depends on a free-will
choice to yield to the feeling. 70 Though the ability to make such a
choice stems from humans' status as rational agents, the
consequences of so choosing are irrational. Once yielded to, anger"the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions"-vanquishes the
reason on which its existence depends. 71 Anger in this quintessentially
Stoic view therefore is a mistake in all instances. 72 And because
Seneca framed anger as a choice, he could call it a blameworthy
mistake, in a way that a primal urge is not.
Seneca wrote largely in response to the account advanced
centuries earlier by Aristotle. In contrast to the Stoics, Aristotle
believed that anger could be entirely good and proper. 73 One should
value one's own safety, dignity, and autonomy, just as one should care
about the safety, dignity, and autonomy of others. One should feel a
strong impulse to respond to affronts to those goods, for only thus are
those goods appropriately valued and the world set right. 74 Anger is in
75
this view "commingled with, if not equivalent to, justice itself."
66. AVERILL, supra note 6, at 83 (quoting SENECA, DE IRA, Loeb Classical Library edition,
AD 40-50/1963, at 115 ("Wild beasts and all animals, except man, are not subject to anger; for
while it is the foe of reason, it is nevertheless born only where reason dwells.")).
67. Id. at 82-83 (citing SENECA, DE IRA).
68.

GERTRUDE GILLETTE, FOUR FACES OF ANGER: SENECA, EVAGRIUS PONTICUS, CASSIAN,

AND AUGUSTINE 7 (2010) (explaining that, to Seneca, anger always is caused either by arrogance
(overvaluation of the self) or ignorance (wrongly thinking things of the world to have value)).
69. AVERILL, supra note 6, at 85 (quoting SENECA, DE IRA, supra note 66, at 267: "No mind
is truly great that bends before injury. The man who has offended you is either stronger or
weaker than you: if he is weaker, spare him; if he is stronger, spare yourself.").
70.

WILLIAM S. ANDERSON, ANGER IN JUVENAL AND SENECA 153 (1964) (the mind causes ira

by assenting to it); AVERILL, supra note 6, at 83.
71. AVERILL, supranote 6, at 83 (quoting SENECA, DE IRA, supra note 66, at 107).
72. Id. at 75, 83.
73. Id. at 82.
74.

WHAT IS AN EMOTION? CLASSICAL READINGS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 44-52

(Cheshire Calhoun & Robert C. Solomon eds., 1984) [hereinafter WHAT Is AN EMOTION?] (quoting
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Not all anger, though, is the equivalent of justice in the
Aristotelian account. Only virtuous anger is just. 76 To be enraged with
a person who has violated one's mother is virtuous, as not to feel rage
would signify an inadequate valuation of one's mother. 77 In contrast,
to become furious at a slave for committing some small error in front
of guests is not virtuous, for it bespeaks too heavy an investment in
78
displaying one's status as a superior.
Reason thus is as central to Aristotle's account as to Seneca's,
but it serves as anger's most redeeming quality. Reason supplies not
just the underlying appraisal that triggers the emotion, but also the
mechanism by which one evaluates it. Through reason one determines
whether the beliefs and values reflected in angry feelings have a good
factual and moral basis. 79 Moreover, reason helps us determine
whether feelings and the actions they spur are commensurate to the
insult. Aristotle wrote that, as to anger, "we stand badly if we feel it
violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately" 8 0-the goal
being not "an algebraic mean between two set quantities," but rather a
response that is perfectly calibrated to the nature of the offense, the
qualities of the offender, and the prospects for corrective action.8 '
With the competing visions thus understood, it is apparent that
the Aristotelian view is the superior one with which to evaluate
judicial anger. This is so, in large part, because it is the view that
most accurately captures lived human experience. Whatever the
rhetorical value of eschewing anger, our lives would be unrecognizable

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS) ("[T]hey are thought to be fools who fail to become angry at
those matters they ought.").
75. Potegal & Novaco, supra note 8, at 18. Plato, too, took the position that anger was "a
natural, open response to a painful situation." Id.; see also AVERILL, supra note 6, at 77
(explaining that, to Plato, anger became "allied with reason to protect the individual from wrongs
perpetrated by others").
76. Antony Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 193, 19498 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) (explaining Aristotelian virtue, in which
reason and passion "speak with the same voice" and jointly manifest in right actions).
77. AVERILL, supra note 6, at 97 (explaining that all but Seneca agreed that one sometimes
has "not only the right but the obligation to become angry"); WHAT IS AN EMOTION?, supra note
74, at 44-52 (quoting ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC) (anger is directed at persons who harm "those
whom it would be a disgrace not to defend-parents, children, wives, subordinates").
78. The example is drawn from Seneca, who criticized anger triggered by "a slave's
breaking of a cup" or "a subordinate's less-than-fawning subservience." NUSSBAUM, supra note
16, at 393. An Aristotelian virtue perspective would offer a different reason to criticize the
emotion-not because it is angry, but because the appraisal giving rise to the anger is
condemnable.
79. NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 29-31.
80.

AVERILL, supra note 6, at 82 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1105B25).

81.

Id.
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without it.82 Not even Seneca appears actually to have believed his
hard line; his real target was violence and cruelty, not anger per se.8 3
The Aristotelian account similarly condemns needless violence and
cruelty, but does not in the same stroke condemn all anger. That
account instead invites us to dissect, educate, and shape this
fundamental human experience through the power of our reason.
The best defense of the Stoic view in the judging context might
be that a judge ought to accept the experience of anger solely for the
purpose of discerning and judging its underlying reasons. At that
point, the judge can choose to act on the basis of the reasons while
leaving the emotion itself behind.8 4 This account reflects Seneca's
position that there is nothing done in anger that could not be done
better under other influences and motives.8 5 For example, he rejected
arguments that anger might be necessary to action-as to motivate
courage in battle-or might motivate a proper response to evil-as
when one's mother has been raped.8 6 Rather, the good warrior or son
would act solely because, coldly considered, that action is the one best
designed to further his goals. Thus, good underlying reasons could be
divorced from all other aspects of the emotion.
While this account has superficial appeal, it is more semantic
than substantive. First, the purported distinction is not so clean. As
82. Id. at 31 (' More than most emotions, anger is often condemned as antisocial.... Yet
anger is among the commonest of emotions."); see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 159-60
(stating that no human group has ever achieved the Stoic ideal, though it may aspire or purport
to). Perhaps having a goal of total anger elimination could facilitate its minimization, which
might be adaptive (particularly for persons with high trait anger); the more realistic goal of
strategic minimization, however, could achieve that benefit without the dangers associated with
striving for the unattainable. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1546-47 (detailing such dangers).
83. Seneca made his case against anger easier by focusing only on its most extreme
manifestations. Where Aristotle contemplated a wide range of angering provocations, from minor
insults to violent attacks, Seneca's examples are of unbridled rage and cruelty. AVERILL, supra
note 6, at 85 (quoting SENECA, DE IRA) ("[If] anger suffers any limitation to be imposed upon it, it
must be called by some other name-it has ceased to be anger; for I understand this to be
unbridled and ungovernable."); see also ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 56-57; NUSSBAUM, supra
note 16, at 393. Seneca's view on anger appears diametrically opposed to Aristotle's largely
because of definitional sleight of hand.
84. This proposition was suggested by a number of participants, including judges, in prepublication workshops of this Article.
85. ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 160 (explaining that Seneca wrote that the angry man
should "rationally set about the punishment or the ending of the crime. Anger contributes
nothing to this goal."); AVERILL, supra note 6, at 84; Potegal & Novaco, supra note 8, at 15-16
(stating that Seneca maintained that "both in sport and war, the disciplined combatants defeat
the angry ones," just as Sun Tzu, a 4th century BC military strategist saw anger as a "fault upon
which military commanders could capitalize").
86. ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 150 (stating that the worst sort of "iniurua," or a
"gratuitous, unmerited, unexpected act of evil," is "the murder of one's father or rape of one's
mother").
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reasons are a necessary part of any emotion, to act on anger is in large
part to act on reasons.8 7 This does not settle the matter, though, as
anger is a complex bundle consisting not just of reasons but also
88
behavioral effects (described more fully in the sections to follow).
When a judge describes herself as acting on underlying reasons alone,
she almost certainly is describing a process of tightly controlling those
effects. The second rejoinder, then, is that the effort to isolate reasons
from behaviors and to mold the latter ought to be understood as a
form of emotion regulation.8 9 The judge may, for example, keep her
voice low and steady, take a break, or restrain an impulse to decide an
issue quickly, letting her temperature cool first. Such a judge is not
refraining from "acting out of anger"; she is choosing how to enact her
anger in light of situational demands. She is regulating anger rather
than setting it aside. This distinction is a substantive one. As this
Article later explains, controlling angry behavior does not generally
eliminate anger experience, and trying to achieve the latter often has
deleterious effects. Nor should we presume that tamping down anger's
behavioral concomitants is always the right path; those concomitants
sometimes are useful, even for judges. 90 A judge who thinks of herself
as engaging with her anger-both its reasons and its associated
behaviors-is in a much better position to enact it appropriately than
one who thinks of herself as not acting on it at all. The former
perspective is encouraged by the Aristotelian account but forestalled
by the Stoic one. In short, while stigma gives judges an incentive to
draw this semantic distinction-acting on reasons sounds more
palatable than acting on emotion-it is neither accurate nor justified.
Finally, the superiority of the Aristotelian account is evidenced
91
by the number of allies it claims, both ancient and contemporary.
For example, the early Christian theologian Sir Thomas Aquinas
defined anger much as Aristotle had-a judgment 'by which

87. See supraPart I.A.
88. Kate Stith, in this vein, has suggested to this author that in this Article the term
"moral disapproval" could be inserted every time "anger" appears, and would more accurately
describe what we want from judges. I maintain, in contrast, that while moral judgment is a
necessary part of anger, anger's other components merit recognition and, sometimes, approval.
89. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
90. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
91. Though Plato and Aristotle held differing views of emotions generally, their views on
anger's redeeming qualities are surprisingly harmonious. Plato asserted that anger can be allied
either with the rational portion of the psychi, as when it helps protect the individual from
wrongdoing, or with the irrational portion, as when loss of control leads to rash deeds. AVERILL,
supra note 6, at 77-78; see also ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 93 (1880)
("IT]he violation of justice is injury," and "is the proper object of resentment, and of punishment,
which is the natural consequence of resentment.").
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punishment is inflicted on sin"-and maintained that, while it can be
turned to bad ends, it is an indispensable aspect of justice. 92 That
account is strongly embraced by virtually all contemporary
philosophers of emotion,93 and underpins virtually all of modern
affective science. 94 This Article therefore analyzes the propriety of
judicial anger through a fundamentally Aristotelian lens.
2. Anger's Core Characteristics
Seneca and Aristotle devoted close attention to anger not just
because of its close relation with reason, but also because of its
distinctive effects, alluded to in the prior Section. If their debate
highlighted the importance of examining those effects, contemporary
psychology has taken up that challenge. A robust literature
demonstrates how, "[o]nce activated, anger can color people's
perceptions, form their decisions, and guide their behavior." 9 5 Such
effects, more closely scrutinized at a later juncture, 96 may be briefly
synopsized as follows.
Anger is strongly associated with a sense of certainty,
individual agency, and control. 97 These characteristics tend to
predispose one to make quick decisions, privileging fast judgment over
close analysis. 98 Anger also energizes the body and mind for action; 99
an angry person feels motivated to approach the offending situation

92. AVERILL, supra note 6, at 87-90 (Aquinas synthesized Aristotelian thought with
Christian teachings). Lacantius distinguished between uncontrollable rage and just anger,
writing that the latter "ought not be taken from man, nor can it be taken from God, because it is
both useful and necessary for human affairs." Id. at 87 (quoting LACANTIUS, DE IRA DEI).
93. Martha Nussbaum and Robert Solomon have been perhaps the strongest contemporary
philosophical voices advocating that emotion-including anger-be regarded as both reflective of
reasons and constitutive of reason. Maroney, supra note 12, at 644.
94. JOHN DEIGH, EMOTIONS, VALUES, AND THE LAw 12, 142 (2008) (reflecting modern
philosophical consensus that thought is "an essential element of an emotion"); Maroney, supra
note 12, at 644 (citing THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS, supra note 32, at
179-234.
95. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 116; see also id. at 121-22 tbl.1 (synopsizing extant
experimental literature on effects of anger on judgment and decisionmaking).
96. See infra Part III.B.2.
97. C.A. Smith & P.C. Ellsworth, Patterns of Cognitive Appraisal in Emotion, 48 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 813, 813-38 (1985).
98. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 126.
99. Emotions carry distinct "action tendencies," or physiological changes that prepare the
body for particular sorts of action. C.E. IZARD, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS 241 (1991) (stating
that in anger "the blood 'boils', the face becomes hot, the muscles tense[,] [tihere is a feeling of
power and an impulse to strike out"); Berkowitz, supra note 57, at 411, 412-13 (explaining
anger's physiological concomitants, including increased heart rate, muscle tension, and a "hot"
feeling), 424 (emotions' "action readiness" tendencies).
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and change it.100 Though the goal of anger is thus in an important
sense positive, the means by which change is pursued can be
destructive. 1 1 Whether acts that are immediately destructive-such
as violent attack or sharp words-ultimately are positive or negative
depends, of course, on context. Raising my voice at one who has
insulted me can quickly signal how seriously I take the insult and jolt
the offender into an apology; raising my voice at an infant who is
crying from hunger serves no such purpose.
Moreover, anger can be-and often is-coexperienced with
other emotions.102 One can feel simultaneously angry and sad,
disgusted, or contemptuous. An angry person can even feel hope and
joy, as when she is contemplating vengeance. 10 3 Combinations are as
varied as the triggering events.
Finally, anger comes in many flavors. State anger refers to an
anger episode consisting of the above-described components. Such
episodes can be brief or they can linger; short spurts of anger often are
being "hot," while lingering anger can harden into a
experienced 1as
"cold" state. 0 4 Anger states can be experienced as uncontrollable,
almost as if imposed by a force outside the self, or they can feel more
manageable; the difference generally hinges on the emotion's
intensity. 10 5 Trait anger, in contrast, refers to a baseline tendency to
feel angry. 10 6 Persons with high levels of trait anger are the ones we
anger
describe as having a short fuse or a "choleric disposition";
10 7
perceived.
are
they
how
and
are
they
who
of
defines much
100. Berkowitz, supra note 57, at 416-17 (angry persons focus on goal of changing
undesirable situations), 424-25 (summarizing research showing that anger often is experienced
as an urge toward verbal expression, such as screaming, and physical aggression, perhaps with
the aim of doing injury); Eddie Harmon-Jones et al., The Effect of Manipulated Sympathy and
Anger on Left and Right Frontal Cortical Activity, 4 EMOTION 1, 1-6 (2004) (anger has strong
approach tendency); Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 291.
101. Nico H. Fridja et al., Relations Among Emotion, Appraisal, and Emotional Action
Readiness, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 212 (1989) (destructive means include aggression
and fighting); see also LAZARUS, supra note 59, at 225 (the angry person may be "potentiated"
toward open aggression).
102. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 131; Mick J. Power, Sadness and Its Disorders, in
HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION, supra note 42, at 497, 503-07 (suggesting that "two or
more basic emotions might lock an individual into a complex emotional state," such as with a
combination of sadness and anger, "a common experience" typifying phenomena such as grief).
103. WHAT IS AN EMOTION?, supra note 74, at 44; Lerner & Tiedens, supranote 58, at 130.
104. Berkowitz, supra note 57, at 414. The speed with which anger arises also can vary. See
Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 290 (explaining that "practiced" anger, as is common within a
family, ignites quickly when "scripts" are activated).
105. AVERILL, supra note 6, at 164, 199, 207-08.
106. Id. at 260.
107. Tanja Wranik & Klaus R. Scherer, Why Do I Get Angry? A Componential Appraisal
Approach, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ANGER, supra note 6, at 243, 256; see supra note 31
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As this brief overview reveals, anger is in an important sense
rational. Contrary to stereotype, it is triggered by reasons-and a
fairly constrained set of reasons at that, having to do with culpable
infliction of unwarranted harm. True to stereotype, it disposes the
angry person to action. Like all emotions, anger is multifaceted,
carrying a complex set of attributes that can be deployed poorly or
well-including, as the remainder of the Article will show, by judges.
C. The Ubiquity and Visibility of JudicialAnger
Anger is particularly important to examine on its own, because
it is one of the most common emotions that judges will experience.
This is true because the sorts of situations and stimuli that tend to
trigger anger commonly are present in judges' work environments.
Not only will judges get angry, but they inevitably will express that
anger to others. Among the judicial emotions, anger is also likely the
easiest to see. Not only is anger one of the most easily recognized
emotions, but (as the following Part will demonstrate) among the
judicial emotions its expression appears to be the least stigmatized.
Anger likely is one of the most common judicial emotions, first,
because it is one of the most common emotions that humans
experience in our everyday lives.1 08 Anger is a particularly common
emotion to experience while at work. 109 Judges' work being what it is,
anger triggers are especially likely to be a regular feature of judges'
days. Many of the people with whom judges must interact, whether
directly or indirectly, are angry. Litigation reflects disputes; disputes
entail accusations of wrongdoing and attributions of blame; the parties
therefore tend to start legal proceedings already angered.1 10
Moreover, the processes of litigation themselves tend to make peopleparticularly lawyers-angry. (Nonlawyers may not understand why
being served with an improper interrogatory, or having opposing
counsel repeatedly reschedule a deposition, can be so infuriating, but
it is.) Judges therefore are exposed to a good deal of others' anger.
(proposing that trait anger, rather than state anger, is a core component of poor judicial
temperament).
108. AVERILL, supranote 6, at 162-63.
109. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HuMAN FEELING (1983).
110. See, e.g., Josh Getlin, Law and Disorder; Tart, Tough-Talking Judge Judy Sheindlin
Presides over the Grim Pageantof Dysfunction Known as Manhattan'sFamily Court, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 1993, at El (stating that in family court, "[e]verything that can go wrong with an
American family plays out on its stage daily"); Don Van Natta, Jr., Dispute of Court Officers and
Judges Escalates,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at B3 ("With so many people and so many emotions
jammed into such small spaces," New York City courts can be hard to manage.).
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Judges must actively manage that anger, including by encouraging
negotiation, policing disputes, and curtailing outbursts.11 1 Through
constant exposure to such unpleasant interactions, a judge may find
herself getting angry, too; this is particularly so if her work conditions
are stressful and physically uncomfortable. 112 At a minimum, she may
get irritated, which shortens her fuse. 1 3 That fuse often will find a
spark: as the following Part demonstrates, the people who surround
the judge often act in a way reasonably calculated not just to make
them angry at one another, but also to make her angry at them.
Anger also is relatively easy to identify. In addition to its
strong tendency to motivate approach, it tends to manifest in a
characteristic facial expression, typically including a frown and deeply
furrowed brow. 1 4 It also changes the quality of one's voice, making it
sharper, louder, and more staccato. 1 5 Importantly, this cluster of
anger characteristics is remarkably consistent. Across cultures, people
are more likely correctly to identify6 a typified "anger face" than any
other facial expression of emotion."
All of anger's typical manifestations, though-on face, voice,
7
and body-can be deliberately regulated, and sometimes overridden."
For example, a person can put on a "poker face," calm the voice, and
restrain herself from shaking her fist."18 Some people are quite adept
111.

Maroney, supranote 13, at 1495 (citing Anleu & Mack, supra note 47, at 614).
112. LAZARUS, supra note 59, at 419-21 (noting studies that show "exposure to irritating
cigarette smoke, foul odors, high room temperatures" and similar conditions "can generate anger
and aggression"). One theory why this is so is that the unpleasant feelings generated by aversive
stimuli prime the person to interpret ambiguous stimuli in a manner consistent with anger. Id.
at 423-24; see infra Part III.B.2. (explaining how anger at one object can predispose a person to
become angry at another); cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental
Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 398 (2006) (offering theory of emotional
contagion, by which one assumes the emotional state of another).
113. See MaryAnn Spoto, N.J. Court Punishes Judge for Yelling at Woman, NJ.COM (June
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/201 1/06/nj-court-punishesjudge
6:00 AM),
2011,
17,
_forye.html (explaining that a judge attributed angry "tirade" against mother in visitation case
to "being 'burned out' from his years in family court with its increased caseload and decreased
staff'); see also LAZARUS, supra note 59, at 418 (noting close relationship between anger and
irritation).
114. Ekman, supra note 59, at 301, 305, 308-09.
115. NIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 62, at 49-50 (describing studies showing emotions'
effect on speech).
116. Jonathan Haidt & Dacher Keltner, Culture and Facial Expression: Open-ended
Methods Find More Expressions and a Gradient of Recognition, 13 COGNITION & EMOTION 225,
256 (1999). Evolutionary theorists posit that humans recognize anger expressions most readily
because another person's anger is relatively likely to signal a survival threat. See Berkowitz,
supra note 57, at 412-14 (describing research on cross-cultural consistency of many anger
attributes).
117. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1501-12 (distilling research).
118. Id.
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at such regulation, while others are not, and people both manifest and
mask anger differently. 11 9 The possibility of effective regulation and
the reality of individual variation can frustrate the ability reliably to
identify anger. Familiarity helps. One often can tell if one's spouse is
angry, for example, by detecting subtle iciness in her vocal tone, or
noticing that he is drumming his fingers heavily. 120 Absent such
familiarity, masked anger can go undetected.
The possibility of effective masking poses a challenge for
identifying judicial anger. Consider a YouTube video of a court
proceeding, which shows a criminal defendant spitting in a judge's
face. 12 1 In that particular clip, the one emotion the judge clearly
122
displays is surprise, and then her face quickly reverts to neutral.
The judge might have been angry, and might have deliberately kept
that anger from showing (perhaps because she believed that is what a
123
judge is supposed to do), but one cannot tell from that video.
A converse problem must also be noted. Because anger is
associated with physical aggression, one may assume that when
aggression is observed the actor must have been angry. This is not the
case. 124 An aggressor may act instrumentally-imagine a calculating
paid assassin. One also may be aggressive from motives of self-defense
or defense of others. For example, two Florida judges recently gained
some infamy for acting aggressively in court. One (whose actions also
were captured in a video posted on the Internet) jumped off the bench
to join others in overpowering a defendant who was attacking a

119. Id. at 1539-41 (citing, inter alia, Sander L. Koole, The Psychology of Emotion
Regulation:An Integrative Review, 23 COGNITION & EMOTION 4, 6 (2009)).
120. William Lyons, The Philosophy of Cognition and Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION
AND EMOTION, supra note 42, at 21, 36 ("[O]ne person might display anger by banging the table,
shouting, and slamming the door," while another "might display it by being unusually quiet and
undemonstrative, and by closing the door with studied carefulness as he left the room with
exaggerated courtesy.").
121. How to Piss Off the Judge, YoUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-uCNo4ky6GXE. Note that the title reflects the poster's assumption that the act of
spitting did anger the judge.
122. Id. The typical "surprise" face entails a widening of both eyes and the mouth, forming
an "0" shape. NIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 62, at 126. Particularly in the slow-motion portion
of the video, one can see these markers of surprise on the judge's face for a quick moment.
123. Tellingly, in a longer version of the video one can gather that the judge was angry. That
version shows her leaning close to the defendant and telling him that she is about to recuse
herself, which will ensure that she will "never have to see him for one further second." Her voice,
facial expression, and words are strongly suggestive of controlled anger. He then spits at her.
After he spits and she displays a surprised-then-neutral face, she sits back, folds her arms across
her chest, and fixes her face into a glower. Suspect Spits on Judge, YoUTUBE (Aug. 6, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?vvuj2-7_uaAQ. Those bookends provide the needed clues to her
emotional state. Many glimpses of a judge's actions will lack such bookends.
124. AVERILL, supra note 6, at 30-31.
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witness; 125 the other pulled a gun from under his robe in similar
circumstances. 126 These judges might have been angry when they
acted, or they might have become angry upon reflecting on the events.
But because their actions need not have been triggered by anger, they
are not evidence of it. 127 Further, judges may sometimes feign anger in
order to make a point.128
Thus, a judge may be angry and we may not be able to tell, and
a judge may act aggressively, or otherwise look and sound angry, but
not be angry. Still, anger remains a relatively visible target. Where a
typical anger trigger is present; where the judge allows typified anger
expressions, such as a glowering face or raised voice; and where acts of
aggression-not just actual violence, but pointing, shaking or banging
a fist, or issuing threats-are accompanied by such facial and vocal
129
clues, we can be fairly sure it is anger we are seeing.
Finally, we do not have to hunt aggressively for such moments
because anger is the emotion judges appear to feel most free to
express. Emotional expression generally is highly stigmatized in
judges, and long has been. 130 This remains true for anger to some
125. Elie Mystal, Judge of the Day: For Real, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 25, 2009), http://
abovethelaw.com/2009/03/judge-of-the-day-for-real/.
126. David Lat, Judge of the Day: John Merrett, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 28, 2007),
http://abovethelaw.com/2007/03/judge-of-the-day-john-merrett/.
127. In contrast, when a judge of the Western District of Tennessee grabbed the lapels of an
attorney, his aggressive behavior was by all accounts motivated by anger. See Federal Judge
Agrees to Six-Month Leave of Absence, Counseling, After Claims He Mistreated Lawyers,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 31, 2001, available at http://www.law.comjsp/article.jsp?id=
900005523602&Federal_Judge_AgreestoSixMonthLeave_of_AbsenceCounselingAfterClai
msHeMistreatedLawyers.
128. Such "fake" anger is of course difficult to distinguish from "real" anger, particularly if
the judge is skilled at fakery. In conversation with judges this author has found that they
frequently speak of doing precisely this, often to give their words greater gravitas and ensure
that people are listening. This author also has observed this tactic with some frequency in
juvenile courts. When assigning consequences to juveniles, particularly when those consequences
are relatively lenient, the judge may "gin up" a range of emotional displays designed to impress
seriousness on the youth, make him feel lucky for not having received a harsher consequence,
and make him afraid of reoffending. When asked, juvenile judges often will freely admit using
that tactic. When an advocate knows the judge well enough, these theatrical displays are easy to
recognize.
129. The primary danger in relying on those signals is, of course, the possibility of "ginned
up" anger displays. See, e.g., infra note 161. Distinguishing between real and feigned anger,
unfortunately, has an "I know it when I see it" quality. One way to work through that difficulty
would be to ask the judge whether she was engaging in a manufactured display. However,
because of the stigma, some judges may claim that to have been the case even when they were
sincerely angry. Cf. Sam Dolnick, After Delay, Kerik's Trial to Start on Nov. 9, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2009, at A26. Teasing apart this puzzle is one important part of the ongoing project,
especially its eventual empirical component.
130. Maroney, supra note 12, at 670-71 (citing POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY, supra
note 19, at 226).

1230

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:5:1207

degree. For example, after media reports represented that a judge had
spoken angrily to a high-profile defendant-the former New York City
Police Commissioner-the judge put himself on the record insisting
that he "wasn't really angry."'13 1 But the stigma attached to anger is
markedly less than the stigma attached to other emotions, say, sorrow
or fear. One much more readily finds in the case law references to
judges' anger than to any other emotion. The media, too, much more
frequently report instances of judges expressing ire at lawyers,
defendants, and witnesses. 132 Indeed, judges sometimes openly own up
to even the most extreme bouts of fury. A state-court judge, after being
repeatedly cursed at by a defendant, indicated that the "[r]ecord
should show that.., if I'd have had a shotgun I need to have shot him
'
but I don't have it today. "133
The reputational costs of showing anger, while not zero, thus
appear to be markedly less than the costs of showing other emotions.
The likely reason for this lesser stigma is a cultural perception of
anger as status enhancing. 134 Whatever the reason, its effect is to
generate relatively more data on judicial anger, data we now may
examine.
II. ANGRY JUDGES
This Part demonstrates the reality of judicial anger by
gathering evidence of its expression. While the ways in which judges
express anger vary, the usual objects of that anger are fairly stable:
lawyers, litigants and witnesses, and other judges.
Judicial anger is common enough that just a bit of digging
reveals its traces. In the case law, evidence of judicial anger may be
found primarily in connection with allegations of judicial bias, often

131. Dolnick, supra note 129; Alice McQuillan & Hasani Gittens, Judge Revokes Kerik's
Bail, Sends Former Commish to Jail, NBC N.Y. (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.
nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Judge-Revokes-Keriks-Bail-Sends-Former-Commish-to-Jail65005027.html.
132. Without purporting to attach to it a quantitative value, I base these qualitative
statements on the experience of conducting (both alone and with research assistants) many
searches for evidence of judicial emotion over the course of five years. Evidence of judicial anger
is relatively plentiful. Evidence of other judicial emotions has been, in our experience, much
more difficult to find, by several orders of magnitude.
133. Johnson v. State, 642 A.2d 259, 262 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
134. See generally Larissa Z. Tiedens, Anger and Advancement Versus Sadness and
Subjugation: The Effect of Negative Emotion Expressions on Social Status Conferral, 80 J.
PERSON. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 86 (2001) (expressing anger raises social status). This may also be a
point of gender differentiation, as male and female anger displays may be differentially assessed
in this regard. See supra note 22.
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urged in support of motions for recusal, 135 appeals from imposition of
contempt 136 and other sanctions against attorneys and parties, 13 7 or
due process challenges. 138 Anger may also underlie imposition of
sanctions against the judge for violating codes of conduct, 139 or prompt
review of his fitness to serve at all. 140 Judges sometimes also share
their experience of work-related anger. Los Angeles trial judge
Gregory O'Brien, Jr., for instance, recently penned a candid, selfdeprecatingly humorous article titled "Confessions of an Angry
Judge."14 1 Finally, as the "benchslaps" feature of Above the Law
suggests, there is a robust market for media reports of judicial anger
expressions. These windows into judicial anger reveal important
42
information about its objects.
135. Gottlieb v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 310 F. App'x 424, 425 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining that
plaintiff alleged that the judge "was biased against him because of 'the tempest which took place
between them.., when they clashed and had words in open court' "); Johnson v. Schnucks Inc.,
No. 09-CV-1052-WDS-SCW, 2011 WL 219900, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2011) (stating that plaintiff
complained that the judge's "tone of voice, overall demeanor, and statements ... were angry and
hostile"); In re Russell, 392 B.R. 315, 355 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008) (explaining that plaintiff
alleged the judge "became very angry and used a very harsh tone').
136. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2006); Johnson, 642 A.2d at 262; State v. Hasan, No. 2007-063, 2009
WL 2475304, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (attorney appealed a contempt finding by
judge who admitted to being outraged by frivolous motions and who apologized for expressing
anger).
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 362 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating
that the judge admitted to feeling "insulted" and "angry by the fact that this case would go up on
a simple $5,000" sanction).
138. Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2004) (describing a judge, who
admitted to being angry at defense counsel, as "angry, abusive, and threatening"); Galvan v.
Ayers, No. CIVS001142DFL DAD P, 2006 WL 657121, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2006) (stating
that a judge expressed impatience with defendant's testimony and had both "exasperated
expressions on his face" and was red in the face); State v. Munguia, 253 P.3d 1082, 108687 (Utah 2011) (explaining that a judge described the defendant's behavior as "selfish" and
"filthy" and said he wished he could have imposed a longer sentence).
139. McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of Judicial
Conference of the United States, 264 F.3d 52, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
140. In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046, 1051, 1053, 1057 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Christopher
Danzig, Ex-Judge of the Day: Yes, Flashing Your Piece in Court Is a "PoorRhetorical Point",
ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 29, 2012), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/ex-judge-of-the-day-yesflashing-your-piece-in-court-is-a-poor-rhetorical-point/ (explaining that a judge was "frustrated"
with rape victim who was being "disrespectful, combative and unresponsive" during testimony;
he pulled out a concealed handgun, pretended to hand it to her, and suggested she shoot her
lawyer).
141. Gregory C. O'Brien, Jr., Confessions of an Angry Judge, 87 JUDICATURE 251, 252
(2004).
142. One important caveat is that these windows are just that: limited openings through
which we see evidence of the phenomenon of interest. It is highly unlikely that written opinions,
self-disclosures, and media reports capture the entire universe of judicial anger, particularly
given the continued traction of the script of dispassion. Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge
in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (2006) (stating that the role of emotion is
concealed because judges are criticized for revealing it). Anger against other judges, for example,
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A. Anger at Lawyers
Lawyers are the most frequent targets of judges' anger. Anger
at attorneys tends to be triggered by perceptions that they are
incompetent; interfering with the prompt, orderly, and fair hearing of
cases; defying the judge's authority; or lying-and sometimes all of
these. As Judge O'Brien quipped, not only is attorney incompetence a
frequent provocation, but "[w]orse still is impertinence by the
143
incompetent, a combination that persistently remains in fashion."
One of the best-known explosions of judicial wrath came from
U.S. District Court Judge John Sprizzo. He ignited a media firestorm
when, in 1989, he excoriated prosecutors for having handled a drug
case so badly, in his view, that he had no choice but to dismiss charges
against half the defendants. 144 When a prosecutor protested that
"heroin traffickers" were about to "walk out the door," Sprizzo
responded:
Now, wait. You are not going to lay that one on me. You let heroin traffickers out the
door by not proceeding in a competent enough fashion.... Do you know what is wrong
with your office, and you in particular? You assume all we have to do is say
narcotics.... [aInd the judge will roll over and let the case go to the jury. You people
have not been trained the way I have been trained.... I am telling you that in this case
you didn't get away with it. If you had been a competent prosecutor, which you are not,
you would have hedged against the possibility that maybe the judge would disagree with
you ...

on the law. ... If these drug dealers are walking free, it is because you did not

hedge against that possibility. Don't lay it at my doorstep .... [I]f they are walking out
of here it is because you people were not competent enough to put in an extra charge in
your indictment. Sit down. 145

The judge's words were so "scathing" that he promptly sealed
the record to prevent media reports from reaching and prejudicing
jurors. 146 As reported in his obituary nearly a decade later, the

is unlikely to bubble into public view at anything near the rate at which it occurs, given the
infrequency with which judges' dealings with one another are open to public view. Still, these
glimpses provide important clues as to what is likely happening more generally.
143. O'Brien, supra note 141; see also Keith L. Alexander, D.C. Superior Court Judge
Declares Mistrial over Attorney's Incompetence in Murder Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-superior-court-judge-declares-mistrial-over-attorneyscompetence-in-murder-case/2011/04/01/AFlymrJC-story.html (stating that a judge, "obviously
angry and frustrated, told [lawyer] that his performance in the trial was 'below what any
reasonable person would expect in a murder trial' ").
144. William Glaberson, The Law; Judge Refuses to Open Proceeding, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1989, at B7.
145. Id.
146. Sprizzo unsealed the transcript of the proceedings only after being legally challenged
by the NEW YORK TIMES. Id.
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infamous incident put Sprizzo's formidable "temper" on public
display.147
While Sprizzo's reaction may have been sharp, it was not
unique. Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski has spoken
unapologetically about his anger at a federal prosecutor, whom he
caught in a lie; indeed, he characterized the incident as perhaps the
angriest he has ever been at work. 148 While Sprizzo chewed the errant
lawyer out verbally, Kozinski did so in writing. In his telling, he
deliberately included the prosecutor's name multiple times in a
scathing written opinion, removing it only after the U.S. Attorney's
Office asked him to do so, and after he was satisfied that his message
149
to that lawyer and his Office had been heard.
Judicial anger at attorney incompetence and misconduct
sometimes comes packaged not in a vicious tongue-lashing but in a
thick layer of sarcasm. This varietal is heavily favored in the
"benchslap" market. Consider, for example, the lawyer-directed
benchslap with which this Article began. U.S. District Court Judge
Sam Sparks, unhappy with lawyers who were seeking to quash certain
subpoenas, issued an order directing them to attend a "kindergarten
party" in his courtroom. 150 At that party, he wrote, they would learn
such crucial skills as:
How to telephone and communicate with a lawyer ....
An advanced seminar on not wasting the time of a busy federal court and his staff
because you are unable to practice law at the level of a first year law student.

147. Bruce Weber, John E. Sprizzo, 73, U.S. Judge, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at B12;
see also Editorial, The Judge Who Spoke Too Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1989, at A32
(characterizing the judge's remarks as "heated" and "angry," and opining that "the judge would
not have got involved with this insult to the First Amendment had he had the presence of mind
to hold his tongue").
148. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1493 (citing Interview with the Hon. Alex Kozinski, Chief
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Nashville, Tenn. (Feb. 6, 2010)).
149. Id.; see also John Schwartz, Judges Berate Bank Lawyers in Foreclosures,N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2011, at Al (stating that judges handling shoddily-done foreclosures have begun to
"heap some of their most scorching criticism on the lawyers"); Christine Stapleton & Kimberly
Miller, Foreclosure Crisis: Fed-up Judges Crack Down on Disorder in the Courts, THE PALM
BEACH POST, Apr. 4, 2011, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/real-estate/foreclosurecrisis-fed-up-judges-crack-down-on-dis/nLrJ2/ ("Angry and exasperated" judges are "hitting back
by increasingly dismissing" foreclosure cases and accusing lawyers of "fraud upon the court.");
Jonathan Bandler, Angry Judge Delays Annabi, Jereis Corruption Trial Until 2012, LOHUD.COM
(May 17, 2011), http://www.lohud.com/article/20110518/NEWS02/102170004/Angry-judge-delaysAnnabi-Jereis-corruption-trial-until-2012 (stating that an "angry federal judge lashed out" at
prosecutors for bringing charges that could have been brought months earlier).
150. Morris v. Coker, No. A-11-MG-712-SS, A-11-MC-713-SS, A-11-MC-714-SS, A-11MC-715-SS, 2011 WL 3847590, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011).
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Invitation to this exclusive event is not RSVP. Please remember to bring a sack lunch!
available if necessary, so you may wish to bring
The United States Marshalls have beds 151
a toothbrush in case the party runs late.

Aggressively snarky, 152 the kindergarten-party order quickly
went viral on the Internet. 153 The judge seems to have been so angry
that he wanted not just to change the lawyers' behavior but also to
154
humiliate them.
Other judges also use barbed sarcasm to communicate anger to
lawyers. Consider Fox Industries v. Gurovich, a routine civil case that
devolved into a "morass. ' 155 Multiple opinions by both the district
judge and the magistrate paint a picture of two people being slowly,
but effectively, driven crazy by Simon Schwarz, Esq. The judges were
infuriated not only by the lawyer's incompetence, but also by his
apparent willingness to defy their authority and lie. In one episode
that the judge called the "mystery of the evanescent courthouse,"
Schwarz missed a hearing (resulting in a default against his client)
and claimed that he and a taxi driver were excusably unable to find
the (very large) federal courthouse, despite being in the right (very
small) town. Such a mishap, wrote the judge, was plausible only if
'"Mr. Schwarz and his driver deliberately avoided looking at the
courthouse (cf. Lot and his daughters fleeing the destruction of Sodom
and Gomorrah, see Genesis 19:15-17)."156 Refusing a motion to
disqualify himself, the judge agreed that he had "expressed varying
degrees of disapprobation, hostility, impatience, dissatisfaction,
annoyance, and anger with [Schwarz's] antics," including by calling

151. Id.
152. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (2012) (defining "snarky" as "crotchety, snappish;

sarcastic, impertinent, or irreverent in tone or manner").
153. Two thousand three hundred and ninety-four people 'liked" or shared the ABOVE THE
LAW feature on the "kindergarten party order" on Facebook, and more than four hundred people
"tweeted" it on their Twitter accounts.
154. See infra notes 270-74 and accompanying text (addressing propriety of seeking to
humiliate).
155. No. CV 03-5166(TCP)(WDW), 2006 WL 2882580, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2006). The case
involved trade secrets and an employment noncompete agreement.
156. Fox Indus., Inc. v. Gurovich, 323 F. Supp. 2d 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). The judge continued:
[Schwarz] offers increasingly detailed and fantastic excuses for his absence. See, e.g.,
Exhibit 17 to Gore's Motion to Disqualify, featuring three photos taken at various
locations within Central Islip that purport to demonstrate the invisibility of the
mammoth white courthouse. Yet, as a point of epistemology, as Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld has observed in other circumstances, "An absence of evidence is not
evidence of an absence." Even if Mr. Schwarz "could not find" it, the Alfonse M.
D'Amato United States Courthouse does exist and is visible to the dozens of other
lawyers, as well as hundreds of jurors, witnesses and workers, who arrive here every
day. (And, ironically, one of the photos ...actually does picture the courthouse.)
Id. at 388 n.1 (emphasis in original).
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various of his statements " 'baloney,' 'false,' 'fraud,' 'impossible,'
'incredible,' and 'a lie.' "157 He refused, however, to apologize for his
anger, for those statements, or for characterizing Schwarz's briefs as
58
"ejaculations."
Snarky benchslaps draw attention because they are funny-a
guilty pleasure, an indulgence in Schadenfreude.159 Indeed, one of the
main draws of television judges is their frequent use of over-the-top
anger and sarcasm. Judge Judy, with her "iron gavel" and "toughtalking take-downs," is "ratings gold"'160 for her network because
people enjoy seeing "bozos loudly castigated."'161 Of course, whether
one finds a benchslap funny depends on whether it seems like the
person really is a "bozo" who deserves the derision. 162 And attorneys
on the receiving end, not surprisingly, often protest that they do not
deserve it, or that even if they do, their clients should not be the ones
to suffer.

157. Id. at 389.
158. About the term "ejaculations," the court wrote:
[The Court is at a loss as to how else to describe the sentences in Mr. Schwarz's brief
that consist only of the words 'How ridiculous!' and 'How pathetic!' . . . Surely Mr.
Schwarz is aware of the alternate definition of "ejaculation": to wit, a "sudden short
exclamation." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th
ed.2000). The Court obviously did not intend an alternative available meaning.
Id. at 388 n.2; see also Fox Indus., 2006 WL 2882580, at *8-9 (magistrate furious over lawyer's
usurpation of court's authority in matter of subpoenas).
159. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (2012) (defining "Schadenfreude" as "enjoyment
obtained from the troubles of others").
160. Cynthia McFadden et al., Judge Judy Rules No-Nonsense Court, ABC NIGHTLINE (May
18,
2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/judge.judy-rules-nonsense-tv-court/story?id=
10667950.
161. Brendan Koerner, Judge Judy: The Most-Watched Court Show for 452 Straight Weeks,
SLATE (May 27, 2005), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/number-1/2005/05/judgejudy.html
(explaining that viewers love Judge Judy "because she offers them a fantasy of how they'd like
the justice system to operate"). Of course, Judy Sheindlin acted the same way when she was a
real judge in the Manhattan Family Court. Getlin, supra note 110 ("Scheindlin runs her court
with an impatience that borders on rage" and speaks "with a hint of fury."). But when she was a
real judge, that angry manner drew "scathing criticism," not adoration. Id. (lawyers complained
that she was "needlessly cruel and sarcastic, a loose cannon in the halls of justice"). Judge Judy
is a good example of the difficulty of distinguishing real from "ginned up" anger. See supra note
128. However sincere her anger displays may have been when she was a real judge, it is hard to
believe that every televised anger display is sincere. She surely is acutely aware that her
popularity and continued employment depend on successfully acting angry.
162. Cf. J. GILES MILHAVEN, GOOD ANGER 72-74 (1989) (noting the humor value in seeing
someone get his "comeuppance"). Indeed, some of the pleasure a reader might take in seeing the
apparently incompetent Schwarz get his comeuppance dissipates upon learning that he suffered
from a serious brain disease, which might have contributed to his infuriating behavior. Fox
Indus. v. Gurovich, No. CV 03-5166(TCP)(WDW), 2006 WL 941791, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12,
2006).
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When judges make their anger at counsel known, those counsel
may cry foul, claiming bias or partiality sufficient to damage their
clients' interests. 163 Challenged benchslaps involve not just sarcasm
but also raised voices, red faces, yelling, insults, and threats. Courts,
however, are reluctant to grant relief on this basis. Importantly, they
are reluctant precisely because they believe such anger to be
exceedingly commonplace. As one reviewing court explained:
[T]here is one form of professional predisposition all judges share that may be classified
as a kind of bias: expressions of dissatisfaction with deficient lawyering, overbearing
advocacy and deceptions that stretch judicial patience to its outer boundaries. These
practices often arouse manifestations of frustration, annoyance and even anger on the
part of judges. But, even if short-tempered, such reactions alone are not sufficient to
disqualify a judge from a case because they are not necessarily wrongful or
inappropriate; indeed, at times they may be called for or understandable. 164

Thus, where counsel repeatedly failed to meet deadlines and
submitted markedly inferior work product, it was perhaps "infelicitous
or unmellifluous" for the judge to refer to his pleadings as "junk" and
"garbage"; but these and other expressions of anger were to be
165
expected and did not give rise to a claim of bias.
Legal doctrine, then, assumes that judges' anger at lawyers is
common and pervasive. As the Supreme Court declared in the leading
case of Liteky v. United States:
Not establishing bias or partiality ... are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction,
annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and
women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A
judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration-even a stern and
short-tempered
16 6
judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration-remain immune.

The empirical basis for this pronouncement is amply confirmed
through the case law. Other courts give judges wide latitude in
expressing anger at attorneys for making "misrepresentations" and
speaking in "half-truths" before the court, 16 7 as well as for asking

163. At least in the context of a recusal motion or due process challenge, judicial bias
against a lawyer is legally meaningful only if it inures to the detriment of the client. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kahre, No. 2:05-CR-0121-RCJ-RJJ, 2007 WL 2110500, at *1-2 (D. Nev. July 13,
2007); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., No. 88 C 6965, 1990 WL 205278, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13,
1990).
164. Teachers4Action v. Bloomberg, 552 F. Supp. 2d 414, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[O]rdinarily
frustration or anger are spontaneous reactions, often provoked by some objectively discernible
cause ....
In this category would fall expressions of dissatisfaction, frustration or anger that
stem from the judge's response to what he or she regards as poor or excessive performance of
counsel or inappropriate behavior of parties.").
165. Id. at 417.
166. 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994).
167. Avitia, 1990 WL 205278, at *3 (attorney with a history of rude behavior was trying to
judge-shop by prompting intemperate displays that he could use to justify a recusal motion).
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improper questions and making baseless arguments. 168 Reviewing
courts sometimes express discomfort with particularly vehement
expressions, such as a judge commanding a lawyer to sit down and
shut up, 169 and are particularly chagrined when benchslapping
170
happens in front of the jury.
The very ubiquity of such anger, however, makes it hard to
condemn. As the Second Circuit has noted: "Judges, while expected to
possess more than the average amount of self-restraint, are still only
human. They do not possess limitless ability, once passion is aroused,
17
to resist provocation." '
A courtroom video posted on YouTube provides a vivid
example. A Kentucky state-court judge can be seen blowing his top
when a smug lawyer accuses him of condoning jury tampering and
threatens an investigation. The judge's voice raises, he curses and
becomes visibly agitated, and at one point he smashes the bench with
172
his fist and declares, "I'll yell all I want, this is my court."'
Very few such judicial anger displays are found to warrant
relief, in no small part because doing so would upend a large number
of cases. But judges do sometimes indulge in displays of anger that are
sufficiently extreme as to prompt corrective measures. 73 In one
criminal case, a trial judge created a poisonously "acrimonious"
environment through repeated clashes with the defense attorney, at
one point implying that he would physically harm the attorney were

168. Kahre, 2007 WL 2110500, at *2.
169. Taylor v. Abramajtys, 20 F. App'x 362, 364 (6th Cir. 2001) (lawyer was trying to
provoke judge into outburst; court declined to find trial judge ran afoul of Liteky standard,
though it was displeased with anger displays before jury).
170. Francolino v. Kuhlman, 224 F. Supp. 2d 615, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The trial judge in a
Mafia case was outraged at the defense for delivering a lengthy opening statement that she
believed was full of irrelevancies and "vented her anger" at these and other perceived missteps in
front of the jury. She also got angry at the defendant, calling him a "prima donna," and accused
defense counsel of making objections "rudely," threatening that "I will do things you don't like
when you treat me in a way that I don't like." Though the reviewing court declined to award
habeas relief, it expressed its displeasure with those anger displays.
171. In re Bokum Res. Corp., 26 B.R. 615, 622 (D.N.M. 1982) (rejecting bankruptcy
attorney's request that the judge be recused because he was so angry as to be red in the face); see
also United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460, 468 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting claim of favoritism by the
trial judge); Green v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 08-1749, 2008 WL 2036828, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
May 30, 2008) (rejecting habeas claim; judge had been very angry at defense counsel for
disobeying order, but did not act irrationally).
172. Prosecutor Makes Threats to a Judge?, YoUTUBE (posted on Feb. 19, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Dk6y5n .- Yo&feature=related.
173. United States v. Candelaria-Gonzalez, 547 F.2d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1977) (trial "judge's
sarcasm, his frequent interruptions and his antagonistic comments in the jury's presence," all
directed at counsel, deprived defendant of fair trial).

1238

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:5:1207

he able. 174 But even though it overturned the defendant's conviction,
the appellate court expressed sympathy for the judge:
[T]rials in the district courts are not conducted under the cool and calm conditions of a
quiet sanctuary or an ivory tower, and ... enormous pressures are placed upon district
judges by an ever increasing criminal docket and a demand for speedier trials of
criminal defendants. These pressures can cause even conscientious members of the
bench.., to give vent to their frustrations by displaying anger and partisanship, when
ordinarily they are able to suppress these characteristics. But grave errors which result
in serious prejudice175
to a defendant cannot be ignored simply because they grow out of
difficult conditions.

In sum, judges' anger at lawyers is an inevitable, even ordinary
occurrence. The degree to which this is so is reflected in the doctrine
that has evolved in response: only the most extreme manifestations of
judges' anger at lawyers trigger oversight, even if quotidian
manifestations prompt occasional chagrin. Nor does it appear that
courts provide breathing room for judicial anger simply as a
concession to human weakness. Sometimes, it seems, they regard such
anger and its expression as being "called for.

'1 76

B. Anger at Partiesand Witnesses
Judges' anger also is directed at parties and witnesses. 177
Compared with lawyers, these participants in the courtroom drama
have fewer opportunities to display incompetence. The more common

174. United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302, 311 n.10, 312 (2d Cir. 1973). The entire
colloquy was as follows:
Mr. Schwartz: [The Assistant U.S. Attorney] promised me those papers for fourteen
months, that's why I moved [for dismissal on speedy-trial grounds], not because of
your Honor. I think you have disliked me since that time.
The Court: If you want to get on an emotional basis, you may.
Mr. Schwartz: I don't. I want to take out the personal feelings between us. I don't
want to have any personal feeling.
The Court: Counselor, the jury box is empty, and I will tolerate some things that come
close to being contemptuous.
Mr. Schwartz: I am only talking to your Honor without the jury.
The Court: You have now interrupted me four times. You are about twenty-five or
thirty-five years my junior and I have not got the strength to cope with you, but I do
have the power-so just stop it.
175. Id. at 304.

176. Teachers4Action v. Bloomberg, 552 F. Supp. 2d 414, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
177. See, e.g., Judge Apologizes for Yelling, Says He Wants to Keep "Gossip" Out of Trial,
SAN DIEGO SOURCE, Jan. 2, 1998, http://www.sddt.com/News/article.cfm?SourceCode=19981028cf
&r=324 (stating that a judge acknowledged that "he had become 'emotional' " when yelling at
defense witnesses). In one anecdotal measure of how much more frequently judges become angry

with lawyers as compared with litigants, Judge O'Brien barely mentions litigants in his account
of what used to make him angry. O'Brien, supra note 141 (complaining only about "stress"
caused by trials of pro se litigants).
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triggers for anger directed at this group are defiance of judicial
authority, insulting the judge, lying, and (particularly for criminal
defendants) having committed the acts underlying the case.
Disobeying direct orders is a particularly efficient route to
judicial anger. 178 In U.S. v. Gantley, for example, the trial judge had
ruled a polygraph examination of the defendant inadmissible; when
the defendant tried on cross-examination to bolster his credibility by
referring to that polygraph, the judge had an immediate outburst.
Though he dismissed the jury and "cooled down," he ordered a
mistrial. 179 Another trial judge became enraged at an expert witness.
He knew that the witness, one Taylor, would in his testimony be
quoting someone who had used the word "goddamned," and he asked
Taylor not to repeat that word. In his testimony, Taylor replaced
"goddamned" with "GD," which made the judge apoplectic: he excused
the jury, chewed Taylor out, and then told the jury that Taylor had
disobeyed him on purpose.180
Criminal defendants, in particular, run into problems when a
judge perceives defiance. One defendant, for example, talked out of
turn.1 8 1 The judge sent the jury out and attempted to explain to the
defendant why he was not permitted to speak. When the defendant
protested, he and the judge engaged in the following colloquy:
Court: Listen to me now.... We are going to have order.... I have asked you kindly to
please speak through your attorney. What... I may have to do is have you bound and
gagged ....
Defendant: I asked kindly to speak to you.
Court: Listen to me.
Defendant: I sure did.

178. See Carol Marbin Miller, Barahona Judge Goes After Gag-order Violators, THE PALM
BEACH POST, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/barahona-judge-goesafter-gag-order-violators/nLy5T/ (explaining that a judge was angry at child welfare workers for
apparently leaking to media information about a case in which they were witnesses, despite a
gag order).
179. United States v. Gantey, 172 F.3d 422, 431 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding declaration of a
mistrial because the "jury's observation of Judge Forester's understandable, if short-lived, anger
•.. is likely to have caused some level of unfair jury bias").
180. Cappello v. Duncan Aircraft Sales of Fla., Inc., 79 F.3d 1465, 1475 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding the furious response inappropriate, as witness was trying to comply with judge's order,
but calling it harmless error). Defiance also may be found in Fox Industries, in which the civil
defendant, Gore, appeared to be doing nearly as much to drive the judge and magistrate crazy as
his lawyer. Gore repeatedly violated court orders not to compete with plaintiffs business. Even
after being found in contempt he insisted (implausibly) that the judge had not found his conduct
to be willful, leading the court to comment drily on the lack of evidence that Gore had been
"having an out-of-body experience." Fox Indus., Inc. v. Gurovich, No. CV-03-5166, 2004 WL
2348365, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug, 25, 2004).
181. Shaw v. State, 846 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tx. Ct. App. 1993).
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Court:... The jury is going to sit there and see you bound and gagged before them, and
they are going to determine you are dangerous person [sic] right before they go out and
determine whether to give you life. Do you really think that's an intelligent thing to do?
Defendant: Do you think what you are doing is an intelligent thing to do?
Court: I'm not going to discuss it any further with you. If you will conduct yourself as a
gentleman, we will proceed....
Defendant: I've been trying. I've been trying....
Court: Let's get the tape.

182

The judge then had the defendant bound and gagged. One gets
the distinct sense that the defendant's cheeky rejoinders, turning the
18 3
judge's words back on him, were the last straw for the judge.
As that colloquy suggests, judges may get particularly angry
when they perceive that a party or witness has insulted them. In yet
another episode of the Fox Industries saga, the judge was none too
pleased to hear tape recordings in which the civil defendant referred
4
to his orders as "a joke" and described them with "an earthy term" 18
that the judge tactfully translated as "merdique.'18 5 Consider, too, the
18 6
defendant in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania.
On trial for holding
hostages in prison, he was found guilty of criminal contempt for
calling the presiding judge a "'dirty sonofabitch,' 'dirty tyrannical old
dog,' 'stumbling dog,' and 'fool' "; accusing him of "running a Spanish
Inquisition"; and telling him "to 'Go to hell' and 'Keep your mouth
shut.' "187 Though the judge at whom these abuses were directed tried
to "maintain calm," the Court found it necessary to have the contempt
proceedings overseen by a different judge "not bearing the sting of
' 88
these slanderous remarks.'
Similarly, in Ungar v. Sarafite the Court noted that some
criticisms are "so personal and so probably productive of bias that the
judge must disqualify himself."'1 9 Though the majority did not find

182. Id. at 485-86.
183. Id. at 486 ("Even from our appellate perch, we acknowledge that the patience of the
trial judge is often pushed to the limit, however, judicial patience is part of the job ....
");
see also
KRQE, Judge Angry at Mouthy Criminal, YoUTUBE (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.youtube
.comwatch?v-uWXFbVpF.pQ (judge scolding accused "mouthy" criminal for impolite courtroom
behavior).
184. 323 F. Supp. 2d 386, 388 (2004).
185. Fox Industries, Inc., 2004 WL 2348365, at *2. Merdique translates as "shitty."
REVERSO, http://dictionary.reverso.net/french-english/merdique (last visited July 30, 2012).
186. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 91 U.S. 499, 505 (1971).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 376 U.S. 575, 583 (1964).
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that to be such a case,1 90 the dissenters opined that the defendant's
outbursts created
a head-on collision between the judge and a witness .... The bias here is not financial
but emotional.... Judges are human; and judges caught up in an altercation with a
witness do not have the objectivity to give that person a fair trial ....
An impartial
judge, not caught up in the cross-currents of emotions enveloping the contempt charge,
is the only one who can protect all rights and determine whether a contempt was
committed or whether the case is either one of judicial nerves on edge or of judicial
tyranny. 191

Thus, the Court has recognized that judges would have to be
superhuman to avoid being angered when insulted. Judge Marvin
Frankel admitted as much in his widely read 1973 book on sentencing,
in which he recounted the following story:
Judge X ... had tentatively decided on a sentence of four years' imprisonment. At the
sentencing hearing . . . [t]he defendant took a sheaf of papers from his pocket and
proceeded to read from them, excoriating the judge, the "kangaroo court" in which he'd
been tried ....
Judge X said, "I listened without interrupting [and] I simply gave the son
192
of a bitch five years instead of the four."

Lying also is a potent trigger.' 93 For example, in response to
harsh words spoken at sentencing by a judge who found the
defendant's testimony to have been "totally unbelievable and
preposterous," the reviewing court wrote that even if the remark were
improper, "it should be recognized that a judge is only human, being
ordinarily imbued with a strong sense of duty and responsibility to the
community. In his or her conscientiousness, the judge will sometimes
' 94
speak out in frustration and even anger.'
Much as it has in the anger-at-lawyers context, then, doctrine
has evolved in recognition of the inevitability of judicial anger against
parties and witnesses because of their behavior during the litigation.
Finally, judges get angry at persons for having committed the
acts that gave rise to the litigation. As the Litkey Court noted, "[t]he
judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be

190. Id. at 584 (1964) ("We cannot assume that judges are so irascible and sensitive that
they cannot fairly and impartially deal with resistance to their authority or with highly charged
arguments about the soundness of their decisions."); id. at 585-86 ("Neither in the courtroom nor
in the privacy of chambers did the judge become embroiled in intemperate wrangling with
petitioner ...petitioner's final intemperate outburst provoked no emotional reflex in the judge.").
191. Id. at 601-02 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
192. MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 18 (1973).
193. Ron Arnold, Angry Federal Judge Rips 'False Testimony' of Federal Scientists, WASH.
EXAMINER (Sept. 22, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/41022 (in a "searing opinion,"
judge "ripped two Interior Department scientists for giving 'false' and 'incredible' testimony").
194. Carr v. Senkowski, No. 01-CV-689, 2007 WL 3124624 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2007); see also
infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text (discussing Campbell v. United States, No. 5:07-0120,
2010 WL 1379992 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 10, 2010)).
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exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to
be a thoroughly reprehensible person." 195 Both civil and criminal
parties draw judicial ire on this basis. For example, local television
coverage reposted on YouTube shows an Alabama Family Court judge
yelling at a mother accused of neglect. After she mutters something in
response to his statement that she might deserve jail time, he smacks
his hand on the bench and barks, 'You're not taking care of your child
the
now, ma'am!" Asked by the reporter to reflect on his outburst, 196
judge said, "I reacted humanly. I'll try not to do that in the future."
A judge may become "ill disposed towards" nonparties as well.
Another YouTube reposting of local news coverage shows a judge,
presiding over the sentencing of a man convicted of child sexual abuse,
loudly berating the victims' mother. She had left the children
accessible to the boyfriend despite having been sexually assaulted by
him herself. Visibly angry-with a red face, raised voice, and shaking
finger-the judge tells the mother that her behavior is "despicable,"
and that she is "disgusting," "an atrocious mother," and "not a
97
victim."1
Though anyone's behavior can draw the judge's wrath, this is
particularly an issue for criminal defendants. First, anger at the
conduct underlying the defendant's offense might increase the potency
of some other provocation. For instance, one Minnesota judge reported
the following incident:
I said, "Sir, you are going to prison, and that's where animals like you belong." And I
usually don't say that but, if you get called a MF [expletive abbreviated] ten times, and
and he's in your face... And I felt bad
it was by someone who raped a step-daughter,
19 8
later. I thought, "OK, you lost your cool."'

The combination of personal attack and a particularly
egregious offense may explain why this judge was unable to maintain
his composure. Similarly, another YouTube video shows a judge
becoming irate while sentencing a man convicted of shooting at police
officers because the man openly mocked him, smiled, and laughed
during the proceeding. 199
195. 510 U.S. at 550-51.
2
196. Judge Naman Yells at Mom, WKRG (May 14, 2009), www.wkrg.com/a/530 8/. The
judge later expressed embarrassment. Id.
197. We Need More Judges Like This, YouTUBE (July 23, 2007), http://www.youtube
.com/watch?v-jbfZGSy-ydY&feature=related (sentencing in Fulton County, Georgia, reported on
Local News 2).
Mary Lay Schuster & Amy Propen, Degrees of Emotion: JudicialResponses to Victim
198.
Impact Statements, 6 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 75, 93 (2010).
199. Associated Press, Judge, Defendant Spar During Sentencing, YoUTUBE (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-X7Z4LQ06B58 (judge threatened to gag defendant, threw a
folder onto his desk, imposed the maximum sentence-to which the defendant replied "thank
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But defendants' offense behavior alone may be sufficient, and
the moment at which judges tend to give voice to that sort of anger is
at sentencing. 200 Judicial anger at sentencing is a special sort of anger
because it is the most likely to be unapologetically acknowledged, its
expression both deliberate and controlled. At sentencing, judges may
perceive that it is part of their role to express anger-not just on their
own behalf, but on behalf of the victims and the public. 20 1 Reflecting
at sentencing, particularly
others' anger is part of the expected script
20 2
cases.
penalty
death
in high-profile and
It would be a mistake to assume that judges are merely acting
as mouthpieces, however; they may well feel the anger themselves.
Indeed, it is extremely common for the media, in reporting on judges'
remarks to the defendant at sentencing, to refer to these judges as
angry.20 3 Of course, these judges might be skilled at mimicking anger

you, I'll take another"-and waved mockingly at the defendant while saying "bye bye"); see also
Vancouver Judge Yells at Convict, Then Apologizes, SEArLE TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008807477-apwavancouverswatsentencinglstl
dwritethru.html (judge spars with defendant and mockingly calls out "bye bye").
200. Anthony McCartney, Angry Sentencing for Murray, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 30, 2011
(judge delivered a "tongue lashing" to doctor convicted of involuntary manslaughter in death of
Michael Jackson).
201. In the words of a judge of the Iowa Court of Appeals:
I see absolutely nothing wrong, and as a matter of fact I think it should be
encouraged, in a judge speaking freely, openly and expansively to the defendant,
and
sympathize, show compassion, warmth,
lecture, cajole, empathize,
comprehension, show anger, umbrage, ire and indignity. These are human emotions
that are meaningful to the person before the court, emotions they understand and
easily comprehend. To go by rote in an emotionless ritual loses its human values and
is less effective ....[Sentencing is] a 'show-down' where society, as represented by the
judge, confronts a defendant for his antisocial conduct ....The time of sentencing is a
desirable place for the judge to let his feeling be known ....
State v. Bragg, 388 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Donielson, J., specially concurring) (Iowa App. 1986). The
view that judicial anger at sentencing communicates a deserved moral message is unabashedly
retributivist. See Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L.
REV. 288, 331-36 (1993) (a sentencing judge's role includes the task of "correcting" a defendant's
"false statement" of his worth relative to that of the victim); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional
Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 671 (1989)
("retribution cannot be neatly divested of anger," and it is "hard to imagine a sentencer finding
that an offender deserves a severe punishment" without calling on anger). However, anger
expression also can serve utilitarian aims. See Bragg, 388 N.W.2d at 190, 192 (harsh words
meant to encourage the defendant to "alter his conduct" and become a "productive, useful
citizen").
202. Pillsbury, supra note 201; see also Benjamin Weiser, Madoff Judge Recalls Rationale
ForImposing 150-Year Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2011, at Al (Judge Chin "seemed to find a
way to translate society's rage into a number").
203. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Judge Detains 2 Teens, Puts Ankle Monitor on Boy, 11, for Flash
Mob Attack on Law Student and Others, A.B.A. J., Aug. 19, 2011, http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/judge-jails 2 teens-putsanklemonitoron-boyj 11re flash_mobattackon1
aw/ (describing sentencing by "angry juvenile court judge").
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in order to achieve a desired effect. 20 4 That phenomenon might be
routine at sentencing, as the judge is explicitly positioned as the voice
of the community. Speaking candidly about sentencing, though, Judge
Denny Chin has acknowledged that "there is a lot of emotion
involved."20 5 Anger appeared to play an important role in his decision
to impose a heavy sentence against a defendant convicted of passport
fraud and trying to fake his own death in the 9/11 attacks, actions
Chin called "despicable and selfish." 20 6 Anger may have played a
similar role in his decision to sentence disgraced financier Bernard
Madoff to 150 years in prison. 20 7 Similarly reflecting on the high
emotionality of sentencing, not just as a mouthpiece but also as a
person, Judge Bennett wrote that some of the sentencing allocutions
he has heard from defendants "have pulled at my heartstrings and
even brought me to tears, while others have given me heartburn and
elevated my already too high blood pressure." 20 8 He placed into the
latter category "infuriatingly insincere nonsense from sophisticated,
20 9
highly educated white collar defendants."
When judges get angry at parties and witnesses, then, it often
is because those persons act disrespectfully, lie, buck the court's
power, insult the judge or the legal system, or have committed acts
(sometimes in court, sometimes just proven there) that lead the judge
210
to conclude they are "thoroughly reprehensible."

204. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
205. Benjamin Weiser, A Judge's Education, a Sentence at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011,
at MB1 (quoting Judge Chin as saying that "[e]motion comes into play in every sentencing
decision").
206. Id.
207. Weiser, supra note 202 ('Two years later, [Chin's] recollections resurrect all the anger,
shock and confusion that surrounded Mr. Madoffs crimes .... ");cf. Richard F. Doyle, A
Sentencing Council in Operation, 25 FED. PROBATION 27 (1961) (sentencing introduces a "human
element" because different judges respond differently "in the presence of emotionally charged
situations personally pleasing or especially repugnant to them").
208. Bennett, supra note 48, at 26.
209. Id. Another apparently infuriating allocution was as follows:
I addressed the defendant: 'I note in paragraph 45 of the PSR report that you knocked
your then live-in girlfriend off the front porch and broke her jaw in seven places and
her leg in three places. Why would you do that to her?' He responded: 'She deserved
it.' I countered: 'Excuse me, I don't think I heard your answer.' His follow up: 'I said
she deserved it.' I don't know what you could have said that would have helped you,
but this really, really hurt you! He received an extra 10 months per word.
Id.
210. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1994).
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C. Anger at Other Judges
Finally, judges get angry at one another. This permutation of
judicial anger is the least visible, and it tends to draw the most
attention when it surfaces. In news coverage of Bush v. Gore, for
example, a commentator noted that the evident procedural wrangling
within the Supreme Court over whether a Florida recount should go
forward laid bare the "tension and anger that the court had managed
211
to contain under a veneer of civility."
On multijudge courts, dissents provide one window into such
anger. Dissent, of course, follows disagreement. While disagreement is
unpleasant, it need not be angering. "Principled disagreement"2' 12 is
highly valued in our system of law, and judges often go to great pains
to express respect for one another even as they clash over legal and
factual interpretation. But dissents sometimes reveal disagreements
with a more personal tone, and these tend to come dipped in
particularly biting rhetoric.
Perhaps no one has perfected the art of the angry dissent
better than Justice Antonin Scalia. 21 3 Linda Greenhouse has described
Scalia as "enraged" and "dyspeptic," particularly when writing in

211. Linda Greenhouse, Bush v. Gore: Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at A18. Judges are not the only court personnel at whom judges get angry.
Don Von Natta, Dispute of Court Officers and Judges Escalates,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at B3
(detailing "high-volume clash laced with personal attacks and, at times, profanity" between New
York City judges and uniformed court officers).
One might assume that interjudicial anger would be more common on multijudge courts, as
those judges are more frequently in contact with one another, and thus have more opportunities
to be angered. This may be true, but as this Section reveals, judges who primarily operate solosuch as district judges within the Fifth Circuit-also get angry with one another. The impact of
the court on which a judge sits, including not just the question of multi-member versus solo
jurisdiction but also subject matter restrictions (e.g., family versus criminal), hierarchal position
(e.g., trial versus appellate), and so on, are worthy of further exploration. One reader has
suggested, for example, that trial-court judges are more likely to get angry at misbehaving
people, while appellate judges are more likely to get angered by ideas-for example, a colleague's
opposing position on a contested idea. Future installments of this judicial-emotion project will
look squarely at these structural distinctions.
212. In Grutter v.Bollinger, Judge Moore said in his concurring opinion:
Dissenting opinions typically present principled disagreements with the majority's
holding[, which are] perfectly legitimate and do not undermine public confidence in
our ability as judges to do what we have sworn to do [and which] can be phrased in
strong terms without damaging the court's ability to function as a decision-making
institution in a democratic society. Judges criticize their colleagues' reasoning all the
time, and, if they are to carry out their oaths of office, they must do so. This robust
exchange of ideas sharpens the focus and improves our analysis of the legal issues.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002) (Moore, J., concurring)
213.

LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: IS PSYCHOLOGY RELEVANT?

20-21 (1999) (Scalia frequently demonstrates both anger and contempt).
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dissent; 214 another commentator describes Scalia's writing as "equal
parts anger, confidence, and pageantry," such that his opinionsparticularly dissents-"read like they're about to catch fire from pure
outrage."215 Of course, Scalia is far from the only Justice to use that
forum to rail against his fellows' perceived misdeeds. 2 16 Nor need
anger always be deduced from words on the page. As Adam Liptak has
noted, choosing to read a dissent from the bench-as Justice Stevens
did in Citizens United-allows a Justice to "supplement[] the dry
reason on the page with vivid tones of sarcasm, regret, anger and
217
disdain."
A look beyond the Supreme Court reveals other instances of
judges publicly expressing their anger at one another. The Sixth
Circuit's handling of challenges to the University of Michigan's raceconscious admissions policies provides an example. 218 A divided en
21 9
banc court disagreed sharply over the policies' constitutionality.
Nothing remarkable there. What was remarkable was Judge Boggs's
decision in dissent to accuse colleagues of deliberately manipulating
220
the composition of the panel in order to determine the result.
Charged language on both sides left little doubt as to the high
emotional pitch. 22 1 Judge Moore, one of the accused judges, wrote that
Boggs had caused "grave harm" to them, the court, and "the Nation as
a whole," declaring that his "shameful" opinion would "irreparably
damage the already strained working relationships among the judges

214. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia Objects, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:40
pm), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.comJ2ll/O3/09/justice-scalia-objects/.
215. Conor Clark, How Scalia Lost His Mojo, SLATE (July 5, 2006, 3:59 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2006/07/how-scalia lost-his-mojo
.html (Scalia's dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey "achieved a level of frustrated fury
usually reserved for undersea volcanoes and small dogs tied to parking meters").
216. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538-47 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (railing against majority's opinion as a "[b]ald assertion masquerad[ing] as
reasoning," and claiming majority was "deceptive" and "disingenuous").
217. Adam Liptak, In a Polarized Court, Getting the Last Word, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010, at
A12 (Justice Stevens's angry dissent in Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct.
876, 929 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting), gained significant power through his decision to read it
aloud, despite obvious physical and mental strain); Dahlia Lithwick, The Pinocchio Project,
SLATE (Jan. 21, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news and-politics/supreme_
courtdispatches2OlOlOl/thepinocchio-project.html.
218. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). The cases ultimately were
resolved by the United States Supreme Court. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
219. Grutter, 288 F.3d 732 (splitting 5-4 in favor of constitutionality of race-conscious
admissions policy).
220. Id. at 810 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
221. For example, Judge Clay decried Boggs's decision "to stoop to such desperate and
unfounded allegations." Id. at 772.
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of this court." 222 Nor did the rancor dissipate. When a report (prepared
by one of the dissenters) later concluded that the Chief Judge had
committed misconduct, he disputed its methods and conclusions to
The New York Times-a rare public move, the reporter wrote,
223
evidencing "continued strained relations."
The Fifth Circuit, too, has exposed its fair share of collegial
relations strained by anger. A long-running feud involving District
Judge John McBryde-reputed to have a "particularly nasty temper,
even for a judge"22L--blossomed in the mid-1990s into one of "the
biggest, rawest brawls in the history of the Federal judiciary."225 At
the feud's pinnacle, a Special Investigative Committee of the Fifth
Circuit Judicial Council investigated charges that McBryde had
abused

lawyers,

witnesses,

and

a

court

clerk. 226 The

lengthy,

proceedings 227

rancorous, and public
revealed serious interjudge
conflict. McBryde once became "angry and lashed out at a fellow judge
who joked about" his impatience; he called two fellow judges
"despicable"; and he ordered a visiting state-court judge removed from
his courtroom without even asking why he was there. 228 It came to
light that the Chief Judge of his District, Jerry Buchmeyer, had
written a nasty satirical song about McBryde and his wife had sung it
at a bar revue performance. 229 The acrimony between the two men was
230
pronounced enough to warrant mention in Buchmeyer's obituary.

222. Id. at 752-58 (Moore, J., concurring) (arguing that Boggs's dissent "marks a new low
point in the history of the Sixth Circuit"). The personal element of the discord was underscored
by Moore's assertion that Boggs had "refused to accept" personal assurances that "we did not
engage in the manipulation of which he has accused us." Id. at 753 n.2.

223. Adam Liptak, Court Report Faults Chief Judge in University Admissions Case, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2003, at A16.
224. Christine Biederman, Temper, Temper, DALL. OBSERVER, Oct. 2, 1997, http://www.
dallasobserver.com/1997-10-02/news/temper-temper/.
225. One FederalJudge Does Battle with 19 Others, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at B6.
226. The Committee held a nine-day hearing with fifty-five witnesses, tried (unsuccessfully)
to persuade McBryde to accept psychiatric treatment, found a pattern of abuse, and
recommended sanctions, which eventually were upheld by the D.C. Circuit. Judge McBryde's
disciplinary history, of which this is just one example, is long. See McBryde v. Comm. to Review
Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of Judicial Conference of United States, 264 F.3d 52
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing to, inter alia, In re Matters Involving Judge John H. McBryde, Under the
Judicial Conduct & Disability Act of 1980, No. 95-05-372-0023 (Jud. Council 5th Cir. 1997);
Report of the Special Comm. of the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council Regarding Complaints Against,
and the Investigation into the Conduct of, Judge John H. McBryde (Dec. 4, 1997)).
227. McBryde, 264 F.3d at 54-55.
228. Id. at 71-72 ("Because of the chilling effect of Judge McBryde's rules and his manner of
enforcement.., attorneys, fearing humiliation or embarrassment, forego actions they believe are
in their clients' best interests and fail to preserve issues for appeal.").

229. Nathan Koppel, Law Blog Obituary: U.S. District Judge Jerry Buchmeyer, WALL ST. J.
L. BLOG (Sept. 23, 2009, 3:34 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/09/23flaw-blog-obituary-us.
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Given cultural fascination with "dirty laundry," public
attention to judicial infighting tends to be colored with more than a
shade of titillation. This is even more so when judges lash out at each
other in ways that are more outr6. When Chief Judge Jones publicly
told her Fifth Circuit colleague to "shut up" because she perceived him
to be hogging oral argument time, it was perceived as truly
shocking.23 1 Even more shocking are allegations of physical violence,
such as those swirling around the Wisconsin Supreme Court. That
court in 2011 was asked to rule on a controversial bill curtailing the
collective bargaining rights of public employees. Chief Justice Shirley
Abrahamson prepared a "stinging" dissent accusing Justice David
Prosser of partisanship. 232 The night before the opinion's release, a
number of the justices gathered in the chambers of Justice Ann Walsh
Bradley. "The conversation grew heated," and Bradley asked Prosser
to leave after he made "disparaging" remarks about Abrahamson.
While accounts here diverge, Bradley claims that Prosser then choked

district-judge-jerry-buchmeyer/. The song, set to the meter and tune of "King Herod's Song" from
Jesus Christ Superstar,contained these lyrics:
Lawyers I am overjoyed
That you're all here today.
Now listen very carefully
To what I have to say.
Stupid lawsuits, motions wasting time,
That's gonna stop, 'cause I'm your God,
And I'll treat you just like slime.
Yes! I'm the Judge,
I'm the Great John McBryde,
Miss a deadline like a fool,
I'll send you to reading school[!]
Biederman, supra note 224, The reference to "reading school" reflects an instance in which
McBryde "bludgeoned" a "hapless" attorney into attending "reading comprehension classes" and
filing "demeaning affidavits" of attendance. These steps were punishment for having (for good
reason) failed to follow the letter of a standing order related to depositions. McBryde, 264 F.3d at
68.
230. Koppel, supra note 229 ("[F]or our money, the most entertaining thing Buchmeyer ever
wrote was directed at a fellow jurist, U.S. District Judge John McBryde."). Many years later,
McBryde remains on the bench, and complaints still roll in at a regular clip. See, e.g., Jonathan
Turley, Texas Judge Clears Attorneys After Judge McBryde Refers Them for Possible Criminal
Prosecution After They Sought His Removal from Case, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 13, 2001, 6:30 am),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/federaljudge-recommends-criminal-chargesjor-lawye
rswho-questioned hisim/.
231. For a representative example, see David Lat, Judicial Diva Gone Wild? Chief Judge
Jones Tells Judge Dennis to Shut Up, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 21, 2011, 7:43 pm), http://
abovethelaw.com/2011/09/benchslap-of-the-day-chief-judge-jones-tells-judge-dennis-to-shut-up/.
232. Crocker Stephenson, Cary Spivak & Patrick Marley, Justices' Feud Gets Physical,
MILWAUKEE-WISCONSIN J. SENTINEL, June 25, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics
/124546064.html.
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her.233 The choking allegation (currently under investigation) has a
history: Bradley has complained of Prosser's periodic "flashes of
extreme anger," and Prosser, for his part, admits to having once called
Abrahamson a "total bitch" and vowing to "destroy her. 2 34
In sum, judges get angry, sometimes very angry. Anger at
lawyers is the most commonplace and the least frequently condemned
manifestation. Anger at others in the dramatispersonae of any given
case, though less ubiquitous, is nonetheless common. It also is
increasingly visible, given the proliferation of cameras in courtrooms
and the ease of online video circulation. Judges' fury at one another
occasionally surfaces, too, despite both incentives to keep it under
wraps and layers of secrecy that facilitate such discretion.
The following Part proceeds from this knowledge base as to
how judicial anger is and takes on the question of how it ought to be.

III. THE RIGHTEOUSLY ANGRY JUDGE
Exposing judicial anger, the project of the preceding Part, is
interesting not only for what it reveals about its objects but also for
what it reveals about its audience. How such anger is evaluatedwhether by a reviewing court, a journalist, a member of the public, or
the anger's target-revolves around two essential axes: justification
and manifestation.
Justification captures the "why" of the anger, while
manifestation refers to the way in which it is experienced by the judge
and expressed to others. Some instances of judicial anger seem both
wholly justified and experienced and expressed in an appropriate way.
For example, lawyers and parties sometimes are seen as bringing the
judge's wrath upon themselves, and it may seem entirely proper for
the judge to feel angry and to let that anger show. 235 Some wrath
might seem justified, as might expression of it, but we might
nonetheless worry about its impact on the judge herself: if the anger
responds to a personal insult, for example, perhaps she will act rashly
out of a desire for score settling.236 Sometimes only the manner of
expression seems inappropriate, such as when understandable ire is

233. Id.
234. Id.; see also Supreme Court Debate Focuses on Rancor Among Current Justices,
MILWAUKE-WISCONSIN J. SENTINEL, Mar. 21, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics
/118410829.html (providing background on the incident).
235. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, No. 5:07-0120, 2010 WL 1379992 (S.D. W. Va.
Mar. 10, 2010); United States v. Kahre, No. 2:05-CR-0121-RCJ-RJJ, 2007 WL 2110500 (D. Nev.
2007).
236. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 91 U.S. 499, 505 (1971).
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vented before the jury. 237 In other instances, the anger itself seems
unjustified-for example, being angry at counsel for imagined
wrongs-and thus any experience or expression of it is deemed
inappropriate. 238 In capturing how we actually think about judicial
anger, then, these elements emerge as the critical ones.
As this Part asserts, those are the correct elements, and it is
possible to conceptualize them in a coherent way-though to date we
have not done so. Relying on the elements of justification and
manifestation helps us to more tightly draw the distinction between
acceptable and unacceptable judicial anger. Recalling Aristotle's
counsel, they allow us to give substance to the idea--otherwise just a
platitude-that judges ought to be angry "at the right times, with
reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right
motive, and in the right way."2 3 9
This Part takes on justification first. It draws on concrete
examples to elaborate the distinction between good and bad reasons
for judicial anger, and argues that a good reason is one that is
accurate, relevant, and reflects good values. It then takes on
manifestation. It explores the various behavioral impacts of judicial
anger, such as increased reliance on heuristics-an experiential
effect-and a tendency to show on the face-an expressive effect.
These effects create both opportunities and dangers for judges. This
Part again draws on concrete examples to demonstrate how we might
distinguish the former from the latter in theory, and argues that
strong emotion-regulation skills help judges enact that distinction in
practice. Adequate justification and appropriate manifestation
together comprise righteous judicial anger.
A. Being Angry "with the Right Motive"
Justification captures Aristotle's concern that anger be
underlain by a correct "motive," in the sense that it is directed at the
right persons and for good reasons. Righteous judicial anger rests on
accurate premises; is relevant; and reflects worthy beliefs and values.

237. See, e.g., Taylor v. Abramajtys, 20 F. App'x 362 (6th Cir. 2001); Francolino v. Kuhlman,
224 F. Supp. 2d 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
238. See, e.g., In re McBryde, 117 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Nazzaro,
472 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1973).
239. AVERILL, supra note 6, at 82 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1106B20, in
THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 958).
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1. Righteous Judicial Anger Reflects Factually Accurate Premises
The most straightforward of these inquiries is the first, going to
accuracy. If a judge is angry at a lawyer for having lied to him, for
example, it is relevant whether the lawyer really lied. To be more
precise, it matters whether the statement actually was untrue,
whether the lawyer believed it to be untrue, and whether the lawyer
intended to mislead. The judge's assessment of the truth status of any
240
of these questions might be literally wrong.
This was precisely the issue underlying one of the many
allegations of misconduct against Judge McBryde. McBryde angrily
accused an Assistant United States Attorney of being "engaged in
falsehood and deception" when she asserted that certain information,
which he wanted her to produce, had been ordered sealed by another
judge. 241 The Fifth Circuit found the accusation to have been
baseless. 242 It eventually imposed a three-year ban barring McBryde
from hearing cases involving certain lawyers, apparently out of
concern that he was unable accurately to judge reality where they
were concerned. 243 At least as to those persons, the Circuit seemed to
worry, the judge was liable to become angry for no reason.
McBryde is not unique in this regard; other judges get angry
for reasons that prove ephemeral. 244 A Florida judge, for example,
became enraged with a group of traffic-offense defendants whom he
thought had disobeyed their orders to appear. It turned out that a
court officer had led them to the wrong courtroom, where they were
waiting as instructed. 245 In another incident, captured on video and
posted on the Internet, a judge appears to have become angry at a

240. Cf. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as ConstitutionalLaw, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 851, 869-77 (2009) (evaluating truth status of judges' assertions about emotion).
241. In re McBryde, 117 F.3d at 213.
242. Id. at 217 ("Judge McBryde's attack on AUSA Darcy A. Cerow and Postal Inspector Rex
Whiteaker and his accusations against them of lying and contempt of court were baseless,
threatening irreparable damage to the professional reputations and careers of both."). According
to Janet Napolitano, then the United States Attorney for the District of Arizona, McBryde's rash
accusation hindered a grand jury investigation, and meant that several persons would likely
avoid prosecution entirely. Id. at 216.
243. Id.
244. See Cappello v. Duncan Aircraft Sales, Inc., 79 F.3d 1465 (6th Cir. 1996) (recounting an
incident where a trial judge "excoriated" a witness who said "GD" after the judge instructed him
not to say "goddamned").
245. In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2007). More disturbing than the original error was
the fact that the judge seemed unconcerned when that error was pointed out to him. He
neglected to take timely steps to release the accused traffic offenders, who because of his orders
had been jailed and strip-searched.
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litigant who sat down slowly when court was called into session. 246
The judge likely thought the man was refusing to sit, but it appears
that he was confused about whether he was supposed to sit or stand,
as the judge had just called out his name.
Judges can, of course, make mistakes. The fact of a mistake
does not impugn her qualifications or character, particularly if it is an
honest one, but it does rob her anger of justification. This is
particularly so if the mistake could have been noticed and corrected.
We do not expect judges to be factually correct as if by magic. We
expect them, rather, to exercise due diligence as to facts, and to be
prepared to subject angering facts to an appropriate, even heightened,
247
level of scrutiny.
The more difficult cases are those requiring that we judge the
anger's underlying premises not for their accuracy but for their
propriety. In these instances, we ask not whether the judge is angry
for no reason, but whether she is angry for no good reason.
2. Righteous Judicial Anger is Relevant
If a judge becomes angry for reasons having nothing to do with
the matter at hand, that anger is irrelevant. 248 It may stem from a
reason, even a good reason, but because it does not pertain to legally
or morally salient features, it is not a good reason for the purposes of
judicial action in that instance.
Liteky offers a constructive parallel, as it reflects a concern
with irrelevance. 249 The primary issue in that case was whether
disqualifying bias could be found only if a judge's ill opinion of a party,
witness, or attorney stemmed from an "extrajudicial source"-that is,

246. RidleyReport.com, Judge Loses It on Cam, Jails Man for Sitting Too Slow, WORLD
NEWS (Nov. 14, 2008), http://wn.com/Judgejoses it_on_cam,jails-manfor._sitting-too-slow.
247. See infra Part III.B.2 (demonstrating how anger itself can curtail such diligent
scrutiny).
248. Unlike other iterations of judicial anger, it is difficult to see reflections of truly
irrelevant anger in the case law or media reports. Judges are highly unlikely to recognize, let
alone admit to, such anger as a basis for action, and it would be difficult for an outside observer
to deduce hidden sources of anger. This therefore is one instance in which the window on judicial
anger is unduly limited. See supra note 132. We can get intermittent hints, including from the
secondary literature. See, e.g., Former Judge Newton Reprimanded by Court, FLA. B. NEWS, June
15, 2000, at 13 (reporting a judge made "threatening and abusive" comments to a lawyer who
had filed a recusal motion, saying "judges can make or break attorneys" and "clients come and
go, but you have to work with the same judges year in and year out. You better learn who your
friends are."); Bennett, supra note 48, at 26 ("Another poor [sentencing] allocution came from a
defendant who, after a lengthy trial, told me what a terrible and unfair judge I was. Hmmm...
Who do you think the trial judge on your § 2255 petition is going to be?").
249. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994).
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one rooted in events outside the four corners of the case. 250 Though it
declined such a holding, the Court did opine that bias is more likely
where the ill will stems from such a source. Its prime example was not
anger but hatred-specifically, hatred of Germans. 251 If a judge,
entrusted with a case involving a German defendant, begins with a
fixed hatred of Germans-based, for example, on his military servicethat hatred is likely to undergird a disqualifying bias. Though the
Court was not explicit as to precisely why, the apparent concern was
that the emotion reflects a category judgment that prevents the judge
from responding adequately to the defendant's individuality.
A similar argument might be made about anger. Anger from an
irrelevant source might color the judge's perceptions and opinions in
diverse and subtle ways. 252 Indeed, the analysis of the following
Section shows that this often is true. 253 A person who is angry for one
reason may attribute ambiguous signals (like slowness to sit) to
deliberate wrongdoing. Such anger seems obviously unfair if its
trigger has literally no relevance: perhaps the judge was ticked off at
the obnoxious lawyer who argued the previous case, and took it out on
the next person to appear. It may also seem unfair even if rooted in
the case but misapplied within it. A judge might find cause for anger
with a litigant when she is really mad at his lawyer. Even if the
lawyer is the target both times, the judge might find fault with some
current, relatively blameless act because she is seething over an
earlier misstep. In still other instances, the judge might have access to
information that she ought not to have, as when a party improperly
raises extraneous and prejudicial information, or that she ought to put
aside for the moment, as when she learns facts during a suppression
hearing that are not at issue at trial. Anger also may be irrelevant
because it relates only to an issue delegated to another decisionmaker,
such as the jury.
In none of these instances is a judge's anger justified, even if it
is entirely understandable.
3. Righteous Judicial Anger Reflects Good Beliefs and Values
Perhaps most importantly, anger that is anchored to an
accurately perceived, relevant event may nonetheless be unjust if the

250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Infra Part III.B.2.
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evaluation of that event's significance reveals undesirable beliefs and
254
values.
Liteky again provides a starting point for that deeper level of
inquiry. In defining the distinction between an "unfavorable opinion"
of a party, which may be allowable, and bias against that party, which
is not, the Court wrote: "One would not say, for example, that world
opinion is biased or prejudiced against Adolf Hitler. The words
connote a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is
255
somehow wrongful or inappropriate....
As the Liteky Court wrote, the unfavorable opinion would be
wrong only if it is "undeserved."256 In that instance, the Court was
implying that hatred of Hitler is deserved, as it represents an
appropriate response to evil.
Drawing again the parallel to anger, judicial anger would be
deserved if it responds to evil, 257 but undeserved if the triggering
action is not properly characterized as wrongful, and its result not
properly considered an unwarranted harm (or any sort of harm at all).
These determinations often are quite different in the judging context
than in other areas of life because actions that constitute wrongful
infliction of harm in other contexts might lack that status in law.
Pleading not guilty to a crime one actually did commit, for example,
might constitute a "lie" in a colloquial sense, but it is not properly
treated as a lie by a judge. Judicial anger at a defendant for having
pleaded not guilty would never be appropriate because the judge who
treats as a lie the decision to put the state to its proof has chosen to
devalue something that law commands her to value. Deeming reasons
as 'bad" or "good" for purposes of judicial anger, then, requires that we

254. SOLOMON, supra note 64, at 271 ("Our emotions betray our philosophies, whether they
are petty, pathetic and narrowly self-serving or expansive, compassionate, principled, and
bold."); Maroney, supra note 240, at 873-75 (judges' emotions reflect their underlying beliefs and
values, which may be normatively assessed).
255. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550 (emphases in original). The Court went on to quote Jerome
Frank thus: "Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence.
If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called trials, he
could never render decisions." Id. at 551 (quoting In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2d
Cir. 1943)). Frank, the famous early-twentieth-century legal realist, was one of the first to argue
that judges' emotions do, and perhaps should, play a role in their decisionmaking. Maroney,
supra note 12, at 654-56.
256. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550.
257. GILLETTE, supra note 68, at 99 (Augustine held that anger, "when it is a reaction
against evil," is "not to be lightly dismissed").
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keep firmly in mind both the legal context and the judge's role within
it.258

Contrast, for example, Shaw, the earlier-described case in
which a judge had the defendant's mouth taped shut,2 59 with Lewis v.
Robinson.260 In Lewis the defendant, after having his motion to
represent himself denied multiple times, shouted profanities at his
attorney and hit him, causing the attorney to bleed. 26 1 The judge
ordered the defendant shackled and his mouth taped shut. In both
cases the judge appeared to be angry at the defendant when he issued
the order to apply the tape. 262 However, in Shaw the judge was angry
because the defendant had talked back to him, while in Lewis the
defendant had become violent. What distinguishes the cases is the
judge's entitlement to be angry, based on normative conceptions of
what represents an unacceptable affront to the judge and others
within his zone of care. Violence clearly is such an affront; being
"mouthy" generally is not, however irritating and unwise it may be. 263
Similar issues arise when a party successfully appeals a ruling
and appears before the same judge on remand. In one such case, in
which a race-discrimination plaintiff won reversal of a directed
verdict, the trial judge complained that the Sixth Circuit had put "egg
on my face." 264 Though he immediately went on to insist that he was
258. O'Brien, supra note 141, at 252 (a judge is supposed to "have thick skin and remain
calm, neutral, friendly, and courteous," even though "in a non-judicial setting I might be
commenting on the horse counsel rode in on").
259. Shaw v. State, 846 S.W.2d 482, 485-86 (Tx. Ct. App. 1993).
260. 67 F. App'x 914 (6th Cir. 2003).
261. Id. at 917.
262. Id. at 923 ("[S]tatements by the trial judge . . . clearly expressed impatience,
dissatisfaction, annoyance, and also anger ....); Shaw, 846 S.W.2d at 487.
263. Shaw, 846 S.W.2d at 485-86 (court distinguished judge's reaction to back-talking from
cases in which the defendant is reasonably believed to be a danger if unrestrained). Being
"mouthy" generally will not provide an adequate reason because litigants have the right to assert
their points of view, even if they do so poorly and to their ultimate detriment. While a judge has
a responsibility to police and channel such expressions as a matter of courtroom management,
she does not have the power to shut them down completely. See N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 10, 1998,
at 18 (reporting that a judge yelled "Are you physically unable to keep your mouth closed?" at a
defendant who whispered loudly during the prosecution's opening statement); Clark County
Judge Shouts Down Defendant, KHQQ6 (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.khq.com/story/9953585/clarkcounty-judge-shouts-down-defendant (judge apologized, saying incident was "the worst I've ever
had happen in a courtroom with someone being mouthy"); Michelle Caruso & Helen Kennedy,
Shaddup, Irate Judge Tells McDougal, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 10, 1998), http:f/articles.
nydailynews.com/1998-09-10/news/18081885_lnancy-mehta-susan-mcdougal-partner-ofpresident-clinton; Spoto, supra note 113 (judge told party, "Don't you dare talk back to me").
These cases also implicate not just the reasons for the judges' anger but their actions in response.
A good deal of the difficulty in Shaw is that the judge's reactions seem overblown, even though
his anger had some basis. See infra Part III.B (addressing appropriate anger manifestation).
264. Anderson v. Sheppard, 856 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1988).
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"not mad about it," when the case again went up on appeal the Circuit
seemed clearly to disbelieve that disclaimer. 265 As the Fifth Circuit
succinctly declared in a different case, "a litigant's taking an appeal of
266
right should not be a source of 'insult' or 'anger' for a district judge."
As these and other cases 267 reveal, one recurring bad reason for
judicial anger is that the object of anger has done something she is
entitled to do. Unjust anger may also be triggered when the anger
object does something she is requiredto do.
In Harrison v. Anderson, for example, a murder victim had,
before her death, mentioned a local judge's name in connection with a
drug operation closely related to the attack that caused her eventual
demise. 268 When that judge was assigned to the homicide trial, the
attorney for the accused sought recusal. The judge became enraged at
the suggestion that he was involved in drug dealing. If,however, the
attorney had potentially credible information that the judge's personal
interests were implicated, he was required as a matter of professional
responsibility to seek the recusal. Indeed, the case makes clear why,
because the judge went on to make a series of rulings against the
defense that seemed designed primarily to keep his name out of the
story.2 69 While any judge would be upset at the suggestion of serious
criminal wrongdoing, no judge is entitled to be angry at an attorney
for doing her job. 270 Even were the allegations in the recusal motion to
cause reputational harm, that would not be an unwarranted harm; the
professional obligation provides the warrant.
Judicial anger, then, may be undeserved by reason of being
directed at persons who have exercised a right or lived up to an
obligation. However, a judge's ire sometimes hits just the right mark.

265. Id. The district judge also appeared to be angry at the plaintiff because he had resisted
settlement offers toward which the judge was pushing the parties. Id.
266. Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2002); see also North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969) (imposition of greater penalty based upon a successful appeal
violates due process).
267. See Alicia Cruz, N.J. Judge Max Baker Reprimanded for Yelling at Mother During
Family Court, N.J. NEWSROOM (June 17, 2011), http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/nj(judge yelled at party
judge-max-baker-reprimanded-for-yelling-at-mother-during-family-court
while she was trying to answer a question).
268. 300 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D. Ind. 2004).
269. Id.
270. See also United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1973) (trial judge became
progressively more angry with the defense attorney as he made reasonable efforts to protect the
defendant's interests); cf. Draughn v. Johnson, 120 F. App'x 940, 945 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting and
reversing lower-court decision granting state prisoner's claim on habeas that the trial judge
"gave the appearance of anger" when the prisoner asked his attorney to move for recusal on the
ground of racial bias).
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Contrast these cases with one in which a prisoner made false
allegations of serious government misconduct. 27 1 The government had
to thoroughly investigate his allegations before debunking them. As
the reviewing court correctly concluded, the judge presiding over that
case was "appropriately angered" by the prisoner's conduct, as he had
27 2
sought to waste time and divert law-enforcement resources.
Similarly, federal judges in New York reportedly were "outraged"
when they observed police officers telling blatant lies while under
oath. 273 In such instances, anger is directly responsive to a
blameworthy harm, and the objects are the persons who committed
those harms. The victims, such as criminal defendants harmed by the
lies of government actors, fall within the judge's zone of care, for she is
responsible for protecting their legal rights. The judge herself is a
victim in many such cases, as when her reliance on lawyers' or police
officers' good faith is abused. The offender's wrongful actions may also
make the judge an unwilling partner in a wrong, as when she lacks
power to improve the performance of a borderline-incompetent lawyer
who is harming his client's interests. 274 More broadly, the fair
administration of justice itself is within the judge's zone of care.
Insults to justice are insults about which the judge is entitled to be
275
angry.
Judicial anger at criminal sentencing often can be justified as
well, and for a similar set of reasons. 276 By the time of sentencing,
blameworthy conduct already has been shown. Assuming, as the judge
must, the accuracy of that finding, the judge is entitled to respond
emotionally to any harm the defendant has caused. Expressing anger
vividly demonstrates to victims and their survivors that they are
within the judge's zone of care. It communicates, in a way that other
demonstrations could not, that they are members of the valued

271. Campbell v. United States, No. 5:07-0120, 2010 WL 1379992 (S.D. W. Va., Mar. 10,
2010).
272. Id.; see also Maroney, supra note 13, at 1498 (Kozinski became livid upon learning that
a federal prosecutor had lied to him).
273. Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/nyregion/12guns.html?pagewanted=all.
274. See, e.g., Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 899 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) ("[Slometimes . . . [tihe judge has to just sit up there and watch justice fail right in
front of him, right in his own courtroom, and he doesn't know what to do about it, and it makes
Sometimes he even gets angry about it." (quoting GERRY SPENCE, OF MURDER
him feel sad ....
AND MADNESS: A TRUE STORY 490 (1983))).

275. Potegal & Novaco, supra note 8, at 18 ("In classical Athens... [a] frequent trope is that
law itself was angry at the accused.").
276. See supra notes 190-97.
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community. 277 It also demonstrates judicial respect for the defendant.
As one feels anger only where a human agent has chosen to inflict an
unwarranted harm, showing anger reveals the judge's assessment
that the defendant is a fellow human possessed of moral agency. By
using his authoritative position to send moral messages to the
wrongdoer, the judge ideally frees others in society from feeling a need
278
to do so themselves, including through vigilante action.
In contrast, judicial anger might be used not to send deserved
moral messages but to belittle, humiliate, or dehumanize. This is a
particular danger in criminal sentencing, but it is by no means limited
to that setting. For example, rather than force the defendant to hear
both an account of the harm he has caused and the judge's moral
condemnation of those acts, 279 she might call him a "lowlife" or
"scumbag." 28 0 Insults, gratuitous displays of power, extreme sarcasm,
mocking, and demeaning language all reflect that the judge is using
anger to assert her dominance. Assertions of power are, to be sure,
sometimes appropriate. Anger at lawyers, witnesses, and parties may
be helpful in reminding those persons that the judge is in charge of
both the courtroom environment and the processes of litigation. 28 1
Belittling actions appear meaningfully different. Acting so as to
humiliate or belittle strongly suggests that anger is no longer

277. This message may be particularly important for victims whose interests have been
diminished not only by the defendant's actions but also by relative societal disadvantage or
scorn. See Terry A. Maroney, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 564, 568 (1998) (quoting judge who actively denigrated gay Asian-American
homicide victim).
278. CAROL TAVRIS, ANGER: THE MISUNDERSTOOD EMOTION 48 (1983) ("[I]n the absence of a
formal judiciary, anger operates as a personal" emotion, driving individuals to "see to it that
their rights are respected and justice seen to.").
279. Benjamin Weiser, Judge Explains 150-Year Sentence for Madoff, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/nyregion/judge-denny-chin-recounts-his-thoughts-inbernard-madoff-sentencing.html?pagewanted=all ("In a society governed by the rule of law,
[Judge Chin] wrote, the message had to be sent that Mr. Madoff would be 'punished according to
his moral culpability.' ").
280. See In re Merlo, 34 A.3d 932, 972 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2011) (judge "in a tirade" called
defendant a "low life" and "a scumbag"); In re Lokuta 964 A.2d 988, 1054 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc.
2008) (judge screamed at the defendant that she was "nothing but a fat pig, whore, lowlife"); cf.
Milmir Constr. v. Jones, 626 So. 2d 985, 986 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993) (judge called attorney a
"scumball").
281. Judges' expressions of anger at one another are harder to justify by this particular
criterion. Judges who are peers-like colleagues on the Sixth Circuit or Wisconsin Supreme
Court-should not attempt to assert power over one another, whether by use of anger or
otherwise. Judges who sit in a superior position, such as those on appellate courts and courts of
last resort, seldom need anger to assert their power over the judges below them in the hierarchy.
Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 585 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("tak[ing] issue with
the Court's failure to reprove . .. the Supreme Court of Missouri's unabashed refusal to follow
our controlling decision in Stanford').
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operating in isolation: instead, it has become corrupted with
contempt. 28 2 Contempt, like anger, reflects a judgment that a fellow
human has acted badly. Unlike anger, it goes on to value that fellow
human as "vile, base, and worthless." 28 3 It explicitly positions its
target as an inferior, 28 4 not just hierarchically but as a human being,
and motivates public assertions of that inferior status. 28 5 When
judicial anger becomes intertwined with contempt, it loses its claim to
justification, for it has internalized a fundamentally bad judicial
value: superiority. While judges have a legitimate claim to authority,
they have no such claim to superiority.
Diagnosing the corrupt values underlying anger that has
become intertwined with contempt delineates a sort of judicial anger
that is particularly unjustified. But the analysis thus far also has

282. See supra notes 96-97 (anger often co-occurs with other emotions); see also Taylor v.
Abramajtys, 20 F. App'x 362 (6th Cir. 2001); Morris v. Coker, Nos. A-11-MC-712-SS, A-11MC-713-SS, A-11-MC-714-SS, A-11-MC-715-SS, 2011 WL 3847590, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug.
26, 2011); In re Moore, 626 N.W.2d 374 (Mich. 2001); Dorian Block, Bronx Supreme Court Judge
Joseph Dawson Calls for Proper Attire in Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 28, 2009,
2
1 shorts-shirt-office-of-courthttp://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-07-28/news/1792768
administration; Cruz, supra note 267 ("I'm a Superior Court judge that demands the respect of
my position, and you will give it to me."). One striking aspect of Judge McBryde's opinions is the
frequency with which he points out the spelling and grammar errors of pro se litigants, which
seems unnecessary and belittling. See, e.g., Scales v. Texas, No. 4:07-CV-160-A, 2007 WL
1341926, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2007) (repeating three times in the space of a page that the
defendant submitted a document entitled "A Writ of Mandams"); Berry v. Bridgeport Pre Release
Ctr., No. 4:03-CV-638-A, 2003 WL 21529726 (N.D. Tex. July 2, 2003) (quoting defendant's
allegation that during an ankle surgery "the other side was life along," and stating that he
"assumes" this was intended to convey that one side of the ankle was fixed and the other was left
alone); cf. Fox Indus., Inc. v. Gurovich, No. CV 03-5166(TCP)(WDW), 2006 WL 941791, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2006) (poking fun at attorney for complaining he needed additional time
because of "the 'onslaught of the Sabbath' ").
283.

ROBERT PLUTCHIK, EMOTIONS: A PSYCHOEVOLUTIONARY

SYNTHESIS (1980); Cendri

Hutcherson & James J. Gross, The Moral Emotions: A Social-FunctionalistAccount of Anger,
Disgust, and Contempt, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 719, 733-34 (2011) (differentiating
anger and contempt). Contempt often is conceptualized as a mixture of anger and disgust.
Ursula Hess, Contempt, in OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 15, at 99-100.
284. ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS: EMOTIONS AND THE MEANING OF LIFE (1993)
(anger is directed toward an equal status individual, contempt toward a lower status individual);
Dacher Keltner et al., Emotions as Moral Intuitions, in AFFECT IN SOcIAL THINKING AND
BEHAVIOR 161, 163 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2006) ("Contempt is defined by feelings of superiority
and dominance vis-A-vis inferior others.").
285. For example, a sneer-commonly (though not universally) associated with this
emotion-vividly communicates one's belief that the other person is contemptible. Paul Ekman,
Antecedent Events and Emotion Metaphors, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL
QUESTIONS, supra note 32, at 147 (contempt's distinct facial expression is characterized by
curling the lip on one side of the mouth). Contempt is uniquely destructive to relationships of
equality. In marriage, for example, evidence of contempt is an especially destructive force that
predicts marital conflict and dissolution. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF
THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2007) (discussing research to that effect by John Gottman).
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suggested two situations in which judicial anger is most likely to be
justified. One is obvious moral wrongs against society; the other is
obvious moral wrongs against the legal system.
Law and morality need not (and often do not) overlap, but they
sometimes do. 28 6 Even in a democratic society in which a wide
diversity of moral judgments is permitted, certain acts of disregard for
others offend virtually everyone, demonstrating the persistence of a
moral baseline. 28 7 It is at these moments of convergence-where we
share a strong moral instinct as to what constitutes an unwarranted
wrong, what it means to act culpably, and who is a member of the
valued community-that judicial anger is at its peak level of
justification. This can explain not just the tolerance, but the
expectation, of judicial anger at criminal sentencing, especially in
cases involving malum in se offenses. The same can be said of judicial
anger at insults to the legal system itself. Those not operating within
that system are unlikely to have a strong sense of precisely what
constitutes an unwarranted harm inflicted upon it, particularly as we
have delegated to judges the authority to police the legal sphere. But
the broader categories into which such harms fall-lying, cheating,
taking advantage, insulting-often do offend a shared moral sense.
The most unambiguously justified judicial anger, then, arises at the
clear intersection of law and morality.
In sum, judicial anger is unjustified if its underlying reasons
are literally incorrect or irrelevant; if the anger object has acted
within the zone of his rights or obligations; or if anger becomes
infected with contempt. In contrast, judicial anger may be justified if
it is based on an accurate perception of reality; is relevant to the
issues properly before the judge at that moment; and reflects a correct
judgment that the offender has inflicted an unwarranted harm on
someone or something within the judge's zone of care-particularly if
that assessment coheres with widely shared moral values.

286. "Hard positivists" maintain that there is no necessary connection between morality and
the category of "law." "Inclusive positivists" agree, but maintain that in any given system of law,
law might sometimes depend on, or at least overlap with, morality. Jules L. Coleman, Beyond
Inclusive Legal Positivism, 22 RATIO JURIS 359 (2009).
287. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994) (condemnation of Hitler is
the paradigmatically easy case); Paul H. Robinson, Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 29 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) (presenting theory of punishment rooted
in empirical evidence of "shared intuitions of justice").
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B. Being Angry "In the Right Way"
Justified judicial anger, even though felt "with reference to the
right objects, towards the right people, and with the right motive,"
should be interrogated further, to determine if it is manifested
appropriately 28 8-in Aristotle's words, whether it is felt "in the right
way." The mechanism for feeling and expressing judicial anger
neither "too violently nor too weakly,"28 9 given the context, is emotion
regulation. If well regulated, judicial anger does not unduly detract
from the work at hand, nor does its expression unduly disrupt either
the mechanisms or image of justice. In fact, well-regulated judicial
anger can benefit those interests, not merely fail to harm them.2 90
If justification relies heavily on philosophical accounts,
manifestation relies heavily on affective psychology. The empirical
data indicate that anger creates both opportunities and dangers for
judges; effective regulation can maximize the former and minimize the
latter.
1. The Behavioral Benefits of Judicial Anger
It may seem odd to speak of anger as having any benefits,
given the negativity with which it often is regarded. Even within
psychology, it historically has been referred to as one of the "negative"
emotions. 29 1 But all emotions confer at least some benefits in some
circumstances, and anger is no different. 292 Anger can be constructive

288. O'Brien, supra note 141, at 251 (describing learning to act differently despite that fact
that the "reasons for [his] anger were real enough").
289. AVERILL, supra note 6, at 82 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS).
290. It is important to note that unjustified anger, too, must be regulated. Just because
anger is not warranted does not mean that judges will not feel it. People often feel emotions they
should not. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1503. A judge may know that he is not entitled to be
angry at a lawyer or party for having appealed, but may feel his temper rising nonetheless.
O'Brien, supra note 141, at 251 ("No one enjoys receiving notice of a writ or published reversal,"
and "[t]here is no salt in the wound worse than that of a smug petitioner/appellant helpfully
informing me in front of a crowded courtroom of a just-issued writ or reversal."). The regulatory
strategies discussed at a later juncture are, therefore, also relevant to unjustified anger. See
infra Part III.B.3. The primary focus here, however, is on the effects that even justified anger can
have on judicial behavior.
291. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 129-31 (anger might properly be regarded as a
positive emotion).
292. Maroney, supra note 12, at 670 n.4 (emphasizing "emotion's capacity for flexible
adaptation to changing conditions") (citing Richard J. Davidson et al., Neural Bases of Emotion
Regulation in Nonhuman Primates and Humans, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION, supra
note 51, at 47-68; Marie Vanderkerckhove et al., Regulating Emotions: Culture, Social Necessity,
and Biological Inheritance, in REGULATING EMOTIONS 1, 1-12 (Marie Vanderkerckhove et al.
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and prosocial. 293 Certain of anger's effects, particularly its tendency to
facilitate judgment and motivate responsive action, make it useful to
judges.
First, anger facilitates judgment. It does this in part by
narrowing and focusing attention. 294 Angering events are vivid and
compelling. The emotion is a signal that something of import is taking
place, and it helps keep attention directed at the offending person and
the situation he has brought about. 295 Once attention is focused on
those objects, anger predisposes one to approach them. 29 6 Whereas
some emotions have a strong tendency toward withdrawal-for
example, disgust makes one back away, whether literally or
metaphorically-anger keeps one engaged. 297 And, of course, anger is
strongly associated with attributions of blame. Blame runs through
the entire experience: anger will not be triggered unless the initial
appraisal of the situation suggests a blameworthy actor, and will not
persist unless that appraisal does as well. Thus, through the
experience of anger, one's attention is focused on the offender and the
harm he has caused; one is motivated to approach the situation, which
provides an opportunity for a closer look; and if that closer look
confirms the attribution of blame, one reaches a judgment.
Second, anger motivates responsive action. It is associated not
only with judgments of injustice, but also with a motivation to restore
justice.29s An angry person tends to have a strong desire to change the
unjust situation for the better.2 99 And because "anger exacerbates risk
seeking and causes people to perceive less risk," angry persons are
likely to take chances in order to bring about that change. 30 0 Further,

eds., 2008)), Whether anger's effects are on balance helpful or unhelpful depends on context, and
should not be presumed to be negative. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 301-04.
293. Potegal & Novaco, supra note 8, at 19 (" '[R]ighteous anger' is not necessarily
constructive and prosocial, but depends on who is getting angry, what they do about it, and who
is telling the story.").
294. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 116; Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 298.
295. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 288 (anger commands attention and is a strong
judgment cue).
296. Id. at 291.
297. Hutcherson & Gross, supranote 283 (noting disgust's withdrawal tendency).
298. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 301.
299. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 116 (anger makes one "eager to act"); Litvak et al.,
supra note 59, at 291. The way in which one strives to make the situation better may take the
shape of actions that are destructive in the short term, like aggression and fighting. Nico Fridja,
P. Kuipers, & E. ter Schure, Relations Among Emotion, Appraisal, and Emotional Action
Readiness, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 212 (1989).
300. Jennifer Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 146 (2001); Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 123-24; Litvak et al., supra note 59, at
296-97.
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because the emotion is associated with optimism and feelings of being
in control, 30 1 angry people have heightened confidence in their ability
to succeed, which helps them take those chances. 30 2 Experientially,
anger generates the energy necessary to enact change. 30 3 The
30 4
physiological changes that cause one to feel "hot" or "boiling"
literally prepare the muscles and mind for action.3 0 5 Indeed,
experimental studies show that people tend to prefer being in an
the anger
angry state when faced with a confrontational task because
30 6
confrontation.
the
at
succeed
and
on
take
both
helps them
Third, anger carries expressive benefits. Anger expressionsraised voice, clenched eyebrows, narrowed eyes, scowls, tensed
muscles-are extraordinarily potent communicative devices.3 0 7 Such
physical manifestations command the attention of others and convey
seriousness of purpose. 308 Anger, simply put, conveys power. 30 9
These attributes of anger are of obvious utility to judgesindeed, one is tempted to say they are necessary to judging. Given the
welter of stimuli to which judges are exposed, they may need the
assistance of anger to flag possible misconduct and direct attention to

301. C.A. Smith & P.C. Ellsworth, Patterns of Cognitive Appraisal in Emotion, 48
ATTITUDES & SOC. COGNITION 813 (1985); Cai Xing, The Effects of Emotion and Motivation on
Attentional Patterns in the Decision-Making Process 2-3 (Feb. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Brandeis University Dept. of Psychology).
302. Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A
NationalField Experiment, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 144 (2003) (angry and happy persons have similar
levels of optimism about the self; angry people tend to believe they can control and improve a
situation, and conquer obstacles); Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 125 (anger triggers "a bias
toward seeing the self as powerful and capable"); Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 295, 296-97, 303
("Anger co-occurred with appraisals of individual control and triggered continuing perceptions of
such control," not "just in the immediate situation but in novel situations.").
303. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 130 ("[Sltudies have found that angry people often
sense themselves as 'more energized' to assault the cause of their anger.").
304. NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 60-61; WHAT IS AN EMOTION?, supra note 74, at 49 (The
"substance" of anger is "the boiling of the heart's blood and warmth.").
305. Nico Fridja, Action Readiness, in OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 15, at 1.
306. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 303; see also id. at 297 (presenting experimental
evidence supporting conclusion that "anger could produce better judgments and choices than
neutrality in situations where risk aversion is inappropriate").
307. Id. at 287.
308. Id. at 287-88.
309. WALTER B. CANNON, BODILY CHANGES IN PAIN, HUNGER, FEAR, AND RAGE 276 (1915)
("Anger is the emotion preeminently serviceable for the display of power .... "); Lerner &
Tiedens, supra note 58, at 116; Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 296; Potegal & Novaco, supra note
8, at 10 ("While community members may experience anger at the social deviance of others,
expressing that anger is the particular province of dominant individuals and leaders who are
deemed to be justified in doing so."); Larissa Z. Tiedens, Anger and Advancement Versus Sadness
and Subjugation: The Effect of Negative Emotion Expressions on Social Status Conferral, 80 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 86 (2001) (expressing anger raises social status).
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it. Given the wearying nature of the job, particularly in the highvolume courts where most judges work, 310 they may need anger's boost
to keep attention from sagging. 311 And, clearly, the most critical task
with which we entrust our judges is that of rendering judgment. Anger
helps them perceive what their judgments are, for the emotion is a
clear sign of the underlying appraisal. 3 12 It then helps them muster
both the desire and energy to do what must be done. Moreover, the
expressive benefits are considerable. The object of judicial anger is on
immediate notice: her attention, too, is more sharply focused, and the
angry judge's message has substantially greater power. Moreover,
when a member of the public sees the judge's outrage, she can
immediately perceive the nature of the underlying judgment, serving
transparency interests. If that judgment coheres with her own, she is
assured that the judge is a worthy steward, one who cares deeply
about the things about which she wants him to care.
Finally, judicial anger can be particularly helpful because
making attributions of blame can be risky. Judges sometimes have to
alienate powerful interests, upset potential voters, and even
jeopardize public safety. Recall, for example, Judge Sprizzo's scathing
indictment of prosecutors' incompetence, which required him to free a
number of people who likely were high-level narcotics dealers. 3 13 Such
a decision takes resolve, which anger can fortify. Similarly, some
judges who concluded that police officers had committed perjury
hesitated in enacting that judgment out of fear of ruining careers or
conferring an undeserved benefit on criminal defendants. 14 Outrage
can help judges push past those fears. It also will make the costs of
action seem more worthwhile. The angry judge has a greater sense of
his potency; that, combined with a more optimistic outlook, helps to
reassure him that his actions can bring about an ultimately positive
outcome, even if the repercussions feel negative in the short term.

310. Anleu & Mack, supra note 47, at 612 (judges' emotional labor can entail significant
costs on judges themselves, including "distress and emotional exhaustion").
311. Indeed, repetition and boredom are regular features of many trials. These phenomena
clearly affect juries, and likely affect judges too. Cf. Juliet Macur, As Clemens Trial Drags, Jury
Keeps Dozing, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2012, at B15 (noting the dismissal of two jurors for falling
asleep during the Roger Clemens trial).
312. Ellen Peters et al., Affect and Decision Making: A "Hot" Topic, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 79, 80 (2006) ("[Alffect can act as information: at the moment of judgment or choice,
decisionmakers consult their feelings about a choice and ask, 'How do I feel about this?' ") (citing
N. Schwarz & G. Clore, Mood as Information: 20 Years Later, 14 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 294 (2003)).
313. See supra note 145.
314. Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
2008, at B1.
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Further, if the judge chooses to broadcast his anger, he significantly
increases the force of his message.
Thus, anger triggered by injustice generates the zeal necessary
for difficult action in service of social betterment, 315 zeal judges can
put to good use.
2. The Behavioral Dangers of Judicial Anger
Anger's effects, however, are not uniformly positive. Just as all
emotions confer benefits in some circumstances, they create dangers
in others. 316 For judges, the main dangers of anger are that it may
trigger relatively shallow patterns of thought; lead to premature or
overly punitive decisions; bleed over into unrelated contexts; and
317
manifest in a grossly disproportionate way.
3 18
First, anger triggers relatively shallow thought patterns.
Other ostensibly "negative" emotions, such as sadness, tend to spur
deeper information processing. 319 Anger tends to have the opposite
effect. An angry person, like a happy one, will tend to skate more on
the surface of available information. 320 Anger is strongly associated
with greater use of heuristics, or short-cut guides to interpreting
stimuli. 32 1 It also is associated with reliance on other sorts of readily

315. MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 366 (1966) ('They called me 'the

angriest Negro in America.' I wouldn't deny that charge.... I believe in anger. The Bible says
there is a time for anger."); Potegal & Novaco, supra note 8, at 19 (noting popular notion that
good works can be triggered by anger, and giving as an example movement to abolish slavery).
316. Maroney, supranote 12, at 642.
317, This was one of Seneca's primary concerns. ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 169 (to
Seneca, anger does not suit the "role of ruler and judge"; anger "should as much as possible be
routed from the mind of [the] judge," lest he "commit the most outrageous injustice in the name
of righteous wrath; and, stubborn in his anger, he will refuse to bend before criticism").
318. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 293 (distinction between anger's process and outcome
effects), 298-99 (depth-of-processing effects). Note, however, that at least one study shows this
tendency is not invariable. "Because anger is associated with the desire to confront, oppose, and
argue," angry persons may "become particularly vigilant about creating oppositional arguments,"
in the course of which they examine evidence carefully and "engaged in better hypothesis
testing." Id. at 299 (citing M.J. Young & L.Z. Tiedens, Mad Enough to See the Other Side: The
Effect of Anger on Hypothesis Disconfirmation (2009) (unpublished manuscript)).
319. Xing, supra note 301 (sadness associated with systematic decisionmaking).
320. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 299; Xing, supra note 301 (anger associated with faster
decisions and reliance on heuristics).
321. Larissa Z. Tiedens & S. Linton, Judgment Under Emotional Certaintyand Uncertainty:
The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
973 (2001) (anger-activated heuristic processing (e.g., greater reliance on the superficial cues of
the message and less attention to the argument quality)); Larissa Z. Tiedens, The Effect of Anger
on the Hostile Inferences of Aggressive and Non-Aggressive People, 25 MOTIVATION & EMOTION
233 (2001) (anger-activated heuristic processing (e.g., use of chronically accessible scripts)).
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"accessible cognitive scripts" such as stereotypes. 322 Anger therefore
increases the odds of interpreting others' behavior and intentions in
conformance with preconceived ideas about how one expects people of
that sort-whatever the salient category-to act.323 Anger-fueled
shallowness of thought can be characterized not only by taking
shortcuts but also by quick endorsement of information that confirms
the initial anger appraisal. 324 The angry person also will be
disproportionately persuaded by angry arguments. 325 Thus, though
anger's approach tendency ensures some closer look, that closer look
32 6
may be cursory, biased, and self-reinforcing.
Second, anger might lead to premature decisions. The
heightened sense of certainty it brings can make one feel confident in
the correctness of her decisions at a relatively early stage,
discouraging consideration of alternatives. 327 This decisional effect is
the natural outcome of the process effects described above. Scriptdriven, shallow processing enables quick decisionmaking. 328 Similarly,
a disinclination to second-guess oneself allows for fast responsive
action. While these tendencies confer obvious advantages in situations
in which further deliberation will be of no utility, they are just as
obviously disadvantageous where information gathering and reflection
would disrupt an unwarranted assumption, uncover a subtle point, or

322. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 126; Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 299 ("Angry
persons tend more to find explanations- for behavior in accessible cognitive scripts, rather than
consider alternatives.").
323. Anger thus can activate prejudice. D. DeSteno et al., Prejudice From Thin Air: The
Effect of Emotion on Automatic IntergroupAttitudes, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 319 (2004); D.M. Mackie
et al., Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context, 79
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 602 (2000).
324. This bias toward emotion-confirming information is not unique to anger. Litvak et al.,
supra note 59, at 298. It also is true of most decisionmaking; once one has come to an initial
hypothesis one selectively attends to and privileges evidence that confirms it. See Keith Findley,
Tunnel Vision, in CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 303,
303-24 (Brian L. Cutler ed. 2012).
325. D. De Steno et al., Discrete Emotions and Persuasion: The Role of Emotion-Induced
Expectancies, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 43 (2004); Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at
125.
326. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 290 (citing B.M. Quigley & J.T. Tedeschi, Mediating
Effects of Blame Attributions on Anger, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1280 (1996))
(describing a feedback dynamic, in which the more anger one feels, the more one perceives others
to be responsible for a negative event, and the more one perceives others to be responsible for a
negative event, the more anger one feels).
327. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 299 (certainty "gives people the meta-level sense that
they already have enough information to feel confident in their judgment").
328. Id. at 289 (emotions automatically trigger a set of responses that enable a person to
deal quickly with problems or opportunities).
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otherwise bring the ultimate judgment in line with a more factually
329
grounded or desirable one.
Third, as suggested in the previous Section, anger can have
bleed-over effects. The fact of being angry at one person for one set of
reasons can dramatically increase the odds of becoming angry at
another person for another set of reasons. 33 0 Such incidental anger
effects have been robustly demonstrated.3 3 1 The angry person is likely
to interpret ambiguous stimuli consistently with an anger hypothesis,
even in entirely unrelated situations. 332 Given the centrality of blame
to anger, one common outcome of this phenomenon is that "anger
triggered in one situation can automatically elicit a motive to blame in
other situations."333 For example, experimentally induced, irrelevant
anger has been shown in mock-jury studies to correlate with more
punitive judgments of tort defendants, as well as with greater levels of
punishment. 334 Thus, anger can-and often does-spill over, leading
the already-angry person to find additional reasons to be angry, assign
blame, and take punitive action. This incidental effect is clearly
disadvantageous if the new anger objects have done nothing to deserve
it.
Finally, anger can manifest in a grossly disproportionate
fashion. Though the emotion is not always associated with hostility
329. Id. at 299 (though angry persons "will be more biased than neutral individuals in a
judgmental context in which additional mental resources will aid decision-making," in "some
contexts, more thinking can produce worse judgments"; for example, "induced sadness increased
reliance on arbitrary anchors in judgment," showing that the "decreased depth of processing
associated with anger may be a boon in some situations" (citing G.V. Bodenhausen et al.,
Sadness and Susceptibility to Judgmental Bias: The Case of Anchoring, 11 J. PSYCHOL. SCI. 320
(2000))).
330. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 287-88; see also NUSSBAUM, supranote 16, at 98 ("Given
one and the same induced physiological condition, subjects will identify their emotion as anger if
placed in a situation in which they are given reasons to be angry (e.g., at the experimenters for
their insulting and intrusive questions).").
331. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 116 (anger has "infusive potential," in that it
"commonly carries over from past situations to infuse normatively unrelated judgments and
decisions").
332. One psychological hypothesis for why this would be so is the "Appraisal Tendency
Framework," which proposes that the "original appraisal patterns associated with each emotion
triggered distinct appraisal tendencies in the subsequent judgments," meaning the subsequent
judgment is likely to be consonant with the first. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at 295, 288-89.
333. Id. at 289.
334. Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions, and Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 BROOK.
L. REV. 959 (2003); Neal Feigenson et al., The Role of Emotions in Comparative Negligence
Judgments, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 576 (2001); Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 119
(angry persons' judgments of criminals and unjust behaviors are likely to be relatively harsh; the
emotion also reduces generosity); D.A. Small & J. Lerner, Emotional Policy: Personal Sadness
and Anger Shape Judgments About a Welfare Case, 29 POL. PSYCHOL. 149 (2008) (induced-anger
subjects provided less assistance to welfare recipients than sad subjects).
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and aggression, it often is. 335 It can drive urges to yell, strike out, and
injure. When such urges pass a tipping point, they can feel literally
'
involuntary-hence the vernacular description of rage as "losing it." 36
And even when anger does not boil over into verbal or physical
aggression, it can make one "indiscriminately punitive." 337 The
powerful nature of the emotion is, in this instance, one of its greatest
liabilities. Further, the sense of personal power anger engenders
might combine uncomfortably with judges' actual power over other
people. Power that goes to a judge's head, particularly if combined
with the feelings of superiority attending contempt, can foster
338
arrogance and abuse. A judge may act like an "absolute monarch,"
or declare-in the words of one trial judge-"I am God in my
courtroom."

339

If the previously described cluster of anger attributes is
necessary to judging, this cluster seems anathema to it. We hope
judges will engage in deep thinking and analysis if the legal or factual
issues before them are at all complex. We expect them to consider
alternatives
and
resist
simplistic
conclusions.
Stereotypes,
particularly very pernicious ones based on factors like race or gender,
would seem to have no proper place. 340 An angry judge might cut off
deliberation and argument before important ideas and information

335. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 116.
336. This is an interesting point of gender divergence. Men typically see anger expression as
a way of taking control, while women tend to see it as loss of self-control. One hypothesis is that
women are more reluctant to express anger and do it only when anger is at a higher intensity,
when they are more likely to feel they already have lost control. Litvak et al., supra note 59, at
304; see supra note 22 (previewing future focus on emotion and female judges).
337. Lerner & Tiedens, supranote 58, at 116, 123.
338. McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the
Judicial Conference of the United States 264 F.3d 52, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Chandler v.
Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit of the United States, 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970)); see also Ungar v.
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 601-02 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (expressing concern with judicial
"tyranny"); McBryde, 264 F.3d at 66 ("Arrogance and bullying by individual judges expose the
judicial branch to the citizens' justifiable contempt.").
339. Gottlieb v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 310 F. App'x 424, 425 (2d Cir. 2009). This particular
danger of judicial anger is acute in judges with high levels of trait anger. In the Article to follow,
focused on poor judicial temperament, see supra note 22, I will argue that judges who deploy
their anger in a relentlessly top-down fashion have aggrandized to themselves the wrath
typically reserved for gods and kings. See AVERILL, supra note 6, at 86-87 (tracing accounts of
anger in Old and New Testaments of the Christian Bible); ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, in WHAT IS AN
EMOTION?, siupra note 74, at 44-52 (the "anger of divine king is mighty"); Potegal & Novaco,
supra note 8, at 9-12 (divine wrath a feature of virtually every known religious system); see also
Ungar, 376 U.S. at 601-02 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (expressing concern with judicial
"tyranny"); supra note 217 (Judge McBryde compared to both God and a king).
340. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 123 ("[T]he mere experience of anger can
automatically activate precursors to prejudice.").
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have time to emerge. A strong sense of certainty can blind her to a
more complicated reality.
It seems clear, too, that we hope judges will assess people,
issues, and cases on their own merits. Most judges juggle many cases
at once, meaning anger triggered in one can infect multiple others.
Litigated cases usually are comprised of a long series of interactions
between the judge and a large cast of characters, meaning grievances
34 1
easily can accumulate and relevant distinctions become muddy.
Bleed-over effects therefore pose a concrete danger in the real world of
judging.
Moreover, it nearly goes without saying that we would rather
our judges not engage in violent anger displays. 342 When a judge truly
'loses it," she has also lost control over the courtroom, impairing both
her ability to project authority and popular perceptions of justice.
Indeed, it is precisely these displays that draw the most media
attention. The damage to the public image of justice can be
considerable even where extreme anger displays take place outside
the courtroom, as with the choking allegation on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. We hope, further, that even where anger is tethered
to a legitimate trigger-such as clear proof that a civil or criminal
defendant committed a serious wrong-judges will be punitive only to
the degree called for by the situation, particularly as they serve as a
hedge against popular calls for disproportionate punishment. Finally,
we hope that judges will use their considerable power responsibly.
Anger's extraordinary strength might push them to abuse it. In sum,
because judges often work under difficult conditions in which the
ideals of deliberation, impartiality, and calm already are besieged, it
seems that adding anger to the mix might sound the death knell for
343
those ideals.
One recent case, Sentis Group v. Shell Oil,344 provides a rich
example of many of these potentially deleterious effects. In that case,
a district court judge dismissed plaintiffs' case with prejudice as a
sanction for discovery abuse. The Eighth Circuit's careful dissection of

341. Recall the consistently infuriating Mr. Schwarz of Fox Industries. See supra notes 15558 and accompanying text.
342. See Rene Stutzman, Judge Shea to Be Reprimanded by Florida Supreme Court for
Yelling at Attorneys, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 1, 2011, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/201106-01/news/os-judge-shea-yells-too-much-20110601_1-public-reprimand-agency-that-policesjudges-complaint (describing particularly inappropriate courtroom behavior that led to the
reprimand of a Florida judge).
343. O'Brien, supra note 141, at 251 ("It is hard to suffer fools gladly when my courtroom is
packed with people wanting my urgent attention.").
344. 559 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2009).
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the path to that dismissal, performed under the doctrinal auspices of a
judicial-bias allegation, provides the raw material from which we may
discern a judicial anger spiral in action.
The judge 345 in Sentis had ample grounds for anger. The
plaintiffs played games with discovery, provided misleading
346
information, and seemed to be looking for ways to evade orders.
Once triggered, though, anger took the judge down a very bad road.
He became predisposed to interpret every new dispute consistently
with his anger baseline. Possible lies became clear ones; investigation
seemed unnecessary. 347 He became disproportionately receptive to
arguments pointing to willful wrongdoing, even though defendants
(sensing an opportunity) seemed deliberately to be "fanning the
flames" of his outrage. 348 Conversely, he became curtly dismissive of
contrary evidence. 349 These phenomena came to a head in an inchambers hearing, a portion of which reads as follows:
THE COURT: Have you produced the 58 documents that were the original request
that's generated the trip to the Eighth Circuit[?]
MR. STARRETT [Plaintiffs' counsel]: To them?
THE COURT: Well, hell, yes. Why would you ask a question like that? Hell, yes, to the
defendant.
[...I

THE COURT: I kept telling you to produce stuff ....
You ducked. You wove. You did
everything to keep from producing them. You go to the Eighth Circuit. They tell you to
produce them, and you still goddamn don't produce them. Now what the hell do you not
understand? You must produce them. Jesus Christ, I don't want any more ducking and
weaving from you on those 58 documents. That's unbelievable. That gives credence to
everything I just heard from the defense. Now, tell me why else you don't think that I
ought to dismiss this case . . . You better tell me. I'm about ready to throw this thing
out. When you tell me that you still haven't produced those goddamn 58 documents after
four times, four times I've ordered you to produce them. You are abusing this Court in a
bad way. Now tell me.

345. In a telling move, the Circuit appears studiously to have avoided naming the judge,
referring to him only as "the court" or "the district court." Id. at 888-905. The decision not to call
the judge out personally reflects its oft-noted "sympathy" for the judge and its unwillingness to
"condemn" his anger, even as it found its effects unacceptable. Id. at 891. Contrast this move
with other courts that have chosen specifically to name the offending persons, so as to make the
anger more pointed. Cf. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (Court, ruling that death-row
inmate did not lose opportunity to appeal because of gross negligence by Sullivan & Cromwell,
repeatedly called out two of that firm's associates by name).
346. 559 F.3d at 891-98 (recounting plaintiffs actions that "provoked" the defense and
district court).
347. Id. at 897 (demonstrating certainty that all allegations of plaintiff misconduct were
true).
348. Id.
349. Id. (judge interrupted plaintiffs counsel when he offered contrary information to
explain plaintiffs conduct).
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MR. STARRETT: Well, may I start with the factTHE COURT: Yes.
MR. STARRETT: -that
documents-

you have not ruled four times to give them those 58

THE COURT: That's it. I'm done. I'm granting the defendant's motion to dismiss this
case for systematic abuse of the discovery process. Mr. Harris [defense counsel], I direct
you to prepare a proposed order with everything you've just put on that presentation. I'll
refine it and slick it up. [Plaintiffs witness] has abused this court, has misled you, has
lied on his deposition. It's obvious he's lying about that e-mail. This case is gone....
What a disgrace to the legal system in the Western District of Missouri.... We're done.
We are done, done, done. What a disgrace.... We're done.

As the initial exchange shows, the judge had a short fuse. To be
sure, counsel's "To them?" is asinine, even taunting-to whom would
plaintiffs produce discovery if not the defendants? At an earlier
juncture, though, the remark might have been merely irritating. But
by that point in the litigation it was all that was required to set the
judge off. His language quickly became hostile and unbounded. The
final straw was counsel's effort to explain that not all of the
documents had been ordered four times. Though perhaps tin-eared,
and certainly poorly timed, the assertion was true; counsel's
distinction between discovery that had and had not been subject to
particular orders was accurate and potentially relevant. 350 But that
technical distinction had ceased to have meaning to the judge. The
simple cognitive schema of discovery abuse, and the flat
characterization of plaintiffs and their attorneys as liars, appeared to
supply sufficient answers. All discussion was cut off; the judge was
simply "done." And once he was "done," he went straight to the most
punitive response possible: dismissal of the entire action, with
prejudice.
The Circuit went to great pains not to condemn the judge for
what appears to have been an understandable human reaction to
trying circumstances. The initial point here is the same. Good judges
sometimes will lose it. 351 While such moments do not impugn them as
people, neither does the fact that they had good reasons always
salvage the situation. And though the Circuit carefully ruled only on
the basis that the Sentis judge's anger spiral created an appearanceof
partiality, 352 the second point here is deeper: it created actual
partiality. Moreover, it did so in an entirely predictable way, a way
that likely is operative in many cases, very few of which will be so
closely dissected. This is precisely what judicial anger, even when it
350. Id. at 902-03.
351. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1542.
352. 559 F.3d at 891.
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has a legitimate starting point, can do if left unchecked-hence Judge
35 3
Posner's caution to "beware" the angry judge.
3. Regulating Judicial Anger to Maximize Benefits and Minimize
Dangers
To summarize thus far: anger facilitates judgment, including
by focusing attention and motivating responsive action. Anger makes
it easier to take chances, confront difficult people and situations, and
incur the costs of action. Its expression communicates with unusual
clarity, conveying the underlying judgment and underlining its
seriousness. But anger also increases reliance on heuristics and
stereotypes, contributes to premature decisions, biases how evidence
and arguments are heard, and can bleed over into unrelated contexts.
An angry person might be unduly punitive, engage in distasteful and
even violent outbursts, and acquire an unwarranted sense of her
power over others.
So at this juncture we find ourselves back on the horns of our
original dilemma. Anger giveth and anger taketh away. Justified
anger is necessary to critical aspects of judging, but simultaneously
has tendencies that can impair judging. 354 We therefore have come to
the juncture at which judges need to call upon emotion regulation.
Emotion regulation is the mechanism by which humans "fine-tune"
our emotional responses to serve situational demands. 355 Strong
regulation skills enable judges to draw on the unique features of anger
35 6
when they are helpful and to minimize them when they are not.
In previous work, I have outlined a theory of judicial emotion
regulation that provides the relevant theoretical model. 357 Rather than
repeat that analysis, the purpose of this Section is succinctly to
encapsulate the model's fundamentals, demonstrate its applicability
to anger, and offer additional insights about anger management.

353. POSNER, supranote 9, at 110.
354. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 132 ('CThe emerging portrait of the angry
decisionmaker is more complex than one might have expected.").
355. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1504 & n.117 (citing Marie Vandekerckhove et al.,
Regulating Emotions: Culture, Social Necessity, and Biological Inheritance, in REGULATING
EMOTIONS 3 (Marie Vandekerckhove et al. eds., 2008)).
356. Id. at 1492 (analogizing to heuristics, which are beneficial in some instances and
detrimental in others).
357. Id. at 1531-32.
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a. Applying the Engagement Model of JudicialEmotion Regulation to
Anger
What I have called the engagement model of judicial emotion
regulation is comprised of three core components: preparing
realistically for emotion, responding thoughtfully to it, and integrating
lessons about (and from) emotion into one's judging. Insistence on
emotionless judging, in contrast, encourages denial and suppression.
That approach not only fails to extinguish undesired emotions, but
also tends to both magnify emotions' effects and needlessly consume
cognitive resources. Much of the psychological literature on which this
model relies has to do with anger. 358 The empirical evidence is
particularly persuasive in showing that anger suppression consumes
resources such as memory; distorts social judgment; risks ironic
35 9
emotion "rebound" effects; and increases physiological arousal.
Engagement thus provides a solid model for judicial anger
management.
Preparingrealisticallyfor anger. First, judges can prepare
realistically for anger by acknowledging that many of the people they
encounter in the course of their work, including lawyers, litigants,
witnesses, and colleagues, are bound to make them mad. A given
judge's anger triggers will, upon introspection, break into relatively
360
stable categories, such as lying, cheating, and abusing others.
Judge O'Brien, for example, was able to identify several reliable
triggers for his own anger, including "lack of civility," "attorney
incompetence," and the "herding cats" work of trying to get everyone
in the courtroom at the same time. 36 1 In contrast, it appears that what
makes Justice Scalia "bl[o]w his stack" is his assessment that other
judges are being sloppy, inconsistent, or adhering to views he finds
362
legally unsupportable or socially destructive.
Identifying recurrent triggers is a critical first step. 363 Using a
regulation technique known as anticipatory cognitive reappraisal, the
judge then may think in advance about how those recurrent triggers

358. Id. at 1527.
359. Id. at 1511 (cataloging experimental evidence showing negative effects of anger
suppression).
360. See supra Part I.A.
361. O'Brien, supra note 141, at 252 ("What is so hard about taking a 15-minute recess in a
jury trial? What is hard is that apparently nobody wears a watch anymore .... 'Here, kitty, kitty,
kitty.' ").

362. Clark, supra note 215.
363. O'Brien, supra note 141, at 251 (describing the first step in handling his anger: "I first
had to articulate the causes").
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relate to her professional goals and obligations. 364 In so doing, she may
precommit to a set of beliefs that will enable her to remain relatively
nonreactive to angering stimuli when they arise. She also may train
herself to focus, and frequently refocus, on her unique professional
role as a neutral arbiter, which can have the same effect.3 65 For
example, a judge may realize that she tends to get snappy when a
party has prevailed against her on appeal. 366 The judge can remind
herself that just as she has a job to do, so too does the lawyer; that just
as she is trying to do her job well, so too is the lawyer; and that
dealing with error correction is part of being a judge in a system with
appellate review, a system that confers many benefits, not just to
society but also to her. That judge can also remind herself that the
legally important element of a reversal is to discern where the higher
court thinks she went wrong, analyze that decision, and work with it;
focusing on those highly specialized tasks makes it harder to dwell on
a sense of personal insult. Another judge, like Justice Scalia angered
by the perceived failings of his colleagues, may remind himself that
part of the point of having multijudge courts is that decent, competent
people sometimes will differ on fundamental issues and call hard cases
differently, not because those people are stupid, but because there are
"conflicting correct" ways of seeing both the world and the law. 367
Judges thus can precommit to ideas that rob a recurring
situation of its angering significance. When that situation arises, it is
368
far less likely to make them angry, even if it displeases them.

364. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1508-09, 1514-17 (defining cognitive reappraisal and
collecting evidence of its efficacy).
365. As I have shown elsewhere, even laboratory subjects who commit to a "neutral
observer" role are able to avoid most normal emotional reactivity for short periods of time.
Whether humans can embody such neutrality in the real world, for longer periods of time, and
when exposed to extraordinarily vivid stimuli is largely unstudied. The best evidence that they
can do so comes from the medical profession. Neutrality is highly valued in doctors but very
difficult to achieve. Medical educators, therefore, increasingly are seeking to teach productive
emotion-regulation strategies, the goal being to help doctors achieve sufficient neutrality to
perform competently but not so much as to lose touch with the human element of their work.
Because the emotional challenges facing doctors and judges can be strikingly similar, that
approach holds great promise in the judicial setting. To draw a crude parallel, the judge learns
to search for legally relevant information in emotionally salient situations, much as a doctor
learns to look for medically relevant information in (for example) a disgusting wound. For both
the judge and the doctor, focusing on the professionally salient aspects of a situation, rather than
on the aspects that would evoke an emotion such as disgust in a layperson, can reduce emotional
reactivity relatively effortlessly. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1521.
366. O'Brien, supranote 141, at 251.
367. Maroney, supranote 240, at 879.
368. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1514-15 (just as a doctor learns to examine a gruesome
wound for clinically relevant evidence, the judge may learn to examine a gruesome autopsy photo

2012]

ANGRY JUDGES

1275

Responding thoughtfully to anger. Judges will, of course,
continue to get angry. They are not "icebergs," 369 and if they remain
open to the dramas unfolding before them they cannot help but react
at least some of the time. Fortunately, anger can be cognitively
reappraised midstream as well as in advance. 370 The judge can choose
to reinterpret a provocative stimulus in a way that will disrupt or
replace the emotion. For example, if an attorney appears to be
gloating over his appellate victory, the judge might ask if she is truly
angry at him for this incident, or whether anger has cumulated or
crept in from elsewhere and is being displaced. Realizing that it is the
latter is likely to diffuse her anger. She also can decide to chalk up his
obnoxious manner to social ineptitude. That attribution may prompt
annoyance, or even sympathy, but is unlikely to trigger anger.
However, cognitive reinterpretation is not always realistic. Not
all stimuli can be anticipated or rethought: perhaps that lawyer really
is gloating, enjoying the experience of publicly taking the judge down
a notch.3 7 1 In such a situation the judge can interrogate the propriety
of the valuation she has attached to her anger's factual basis. She
might, for example, ask herself what is it that she feels has been
harmed. If it is her reputation or dignity, does this lawyer's conduct
pose any real threat to those goods? Perhaps the people whose
opinions matter most to the judge, such as judicial peers, will be
utterly unaffected, even sympathetic. And even if important others
truly will regard her less favorably, the judge still can ask whether
responding with anger reflects defensible values. 372 Perhaps that
reaction shows that she prizes her public reputation inordinately. She
might prefer to ground her sense of dignity and worth, as a person and
as a judge, in her own honest assessment of the value and quality of
her work. She may also ask herself honestly whether she has come to
regard the offending lawyer as literally beneath her-a cretin, a moral
inferior-indicating the corrosive presence of contempt. The judge may
diffuse the feeling by determining that her anger reflects evaluations
that, despite their grounding in reality, she has reason to reject.

for legally relevant criteria; both come to experience such stimuli as not disgusting but
informational).
369. Id. at 1537 (quoting judge in People v. Carter, No. C053369, 2009 WL 626113 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 12, 2009)).
370. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1522-23.
371. O'Brien, supra note 141, at 251 ('There is no salt in the wound worse than that of a
smug petitioner/appellant helpfully informing me in front of a crowded courtroom of a just-issued
writ or reversal.").
372. Id. at 253 ('The rules are rules. They are not commandments. It may be a sin to break
a commandment, but a rule is simply a rule.").
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Some anger might pass all these checkpoints. A defendant
spitting in one's face, for example, is virtually impossible to interpret
as anything other than a deliberate expression of hatred. That
expression is condemnable because of the extreme and unwarranted
disregard it shows, not just of the judge but also of the legitimacy of
the legal process. 37 3 The anger is both reality based and normatively
proper; indeed, Aristotle might identify this as a situation in which not
getting angry would be suspect. Regardless, the judge can ask herself
whether it is relevant to the tasks at hand, and whether giving voice
374
to it would further or hinder her overall goals.
As the case of the spitting defendant shows, such a
determination involves complex judgment calls. If the defendant is
going to continue to appear before that judge, the anger might inform
how she chooses to interact with him. For example, it may help her
feel comfortable concluding that he has no respect for the forum and
deciding to withhold discretionary benefits-such as continuances-or
chances to be near her. 375 Similarly, expressing her anger in some way
might convey how seriously she regards the conduct. Such a move
might both prompt behavioral change and reassert her authority, both
to him and to spectators. But several variables could shift her
assessment. If (as was the case in the actual situation) the defendant
is being removed and will pose no ongoing threat, there is no need to
set ground rules for future interaction. Expressing anger to prompt
behavior change or an apology 376 would be wasted effort if (as seems
likely) the defendant has no interest in obeying the judge, no matter
what she says or does. Nor will such expression necessarily reinforce
authority. Particularly if it is loud or hostile, it might model for others
377
behavior that the judge will then have to expend energy to control.
If everyone else present shares the assessment that the defendant is
373. This is not to say that cognitive reappraisal is impossible, just that it would be
particularly hard. The judge might, for example, decide to believe that a defendant who would
act this way is deeply disturbed for reasons having nothing to do with her. Positioning herself as
an accidental object of his hatred might sap the situation of its personal relevance, and thus its
angering propensity.
374. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1540-41.
375. Restricting the defendant's physical access to the judge would be a productive sort of
"situation modification." Id. at 1541.
376. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004) (explaining power of apology).
377. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1540 n.325 (explaining how judges regulate emotion in
order to model courtroom behavior for others). If in a different situation the judge's anger is
based in reality, defensible, and relevant, she might nonetheless choose to mask it-for example,
because she wants to hide her opinions from a jury. Id. at 1540-41; see also Kenji Yoshino, The
"Civil" Courts: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 478 (2012) ("[T]he presence
of a judge can do wonders for mitigating the race to the bottom of incivility.").
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irrational and beyond reach (which also seems likely), expressing
anger might lead them to perceive that he "won" by getting the judge
to "sink to his level." In that case, restraint might seem admirable.
What course of action is most advantageous to the judge often will rely
on a split-second assessment of all these variables, a process that for a
good judge likely becomes more intuitive and well calibrated over
378
time.
Finally, judges can respond thoughtfully to anger if they are
specifically aware of some of its more dangerous tendencies, such as
increasing reliance on heuristics and stereotypes. Having cultivated
the requisite self-awareness, the judge can take the feeling of rising
anger as a sign that she might need to force herself to proceed with
greater than usual caution, to take more rather than less time, and to
honestly interrogate the adequacy of her thought processes.
Integrating lessons from anger. The final aspect of judicial
emotion regulation is to strive to incorporate lessons from one's
emotions into the broader story of her life as a judge. Much of this
process depends on the self-awareness and introspection that also
underlies the preceding steps. Two other components are worthy of
additional explanation: disclosure and self-acceptance.
Expressing anger in the moment-for example, to an offending
attorney-is one form of emotional disclosure. But other forms may be
equally or more helpful, particularly in encouraging the judge to
identify recurrent triggers and evaluate their relevance to her work.
The judge may choose to discuss angering experiences with family,
friends, other judges, or even the public. 379 Those to whom anger is
disclosed can offer their insights into whether it seems factually
based, relevant, normatively defensible, and the like; this discursive
process can provide the judge with needed feedback. The judge thus
builds a "database" of her work-related anger, one that can inform the
process of preparing and responding to anger going forward.
Disclosure may also have subjective benefits. While disclosing
anger is unlikely to diffuse it (and, as explained below, may sometimes
increase it), disclosure can make it far easier to live with. 380 This is
even so where the judge is not proud of how she acted. Efforts at
regulation will sometimes (perhaps often) fail. The judge may lose
378. I say "for a good judge" because judges with consistent anger management problems do
not appear to improve with practice. Poor emotion regulation habits can become dangerously
self-reinforcing, and in the case of anger likely ossify into patterns that eventually we regard as
evidencing poor temperament. Maroney, supranote 13, at 1543.
379. Id. at 1527-30.
380. Id. (discussing research on the many social and personal benefits of emotion disclosure,
even for unpleasant emotions).
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composure when she wishes she had not, or continue to feel anger she
382
knows she should not.38 1 In those instances, she might feel shame,
which might motivate her to hide her feelings. 383 She could choose
instead to regard the shame-inducing anger episode as an opportunity
for self-improvement. 384 Such an effort might include public sharing;
for example, the judge may find it helpful to apologize. 385 If public
expressions feel counterproductive or intimidating, she might talk
with trusted confidantes. 386 Even if the judge keeps her dialogue
entirely internal, she can choose simply to be forgiving of her own
humanity. 387 Such self-acceptance may help the judge recover valuable
perspective-allowing her, for example, to focus instead on the
satisfying aspects of her job, and to regard occasional turmoil as the
388
price of gaining the many benefits of being a judge.
In sum, these three steps-realistic preparation, thoughtful
response, and integration-are recursively related. Commitment to
each facilitates success at any one. Judges can leverage the power of
their reason to anticipate and, if needed, rethink their angry feelings.
They can allow, restrain, or shape anger expression to serve
utilitarian goals. They can build a highly personalized account of what
sort of anger is to be welcomed and what rejected, and forgive
themselves their inevitable missteps. Judges must invest time and
thought in recognizing what tends to make them angry, how they tend
381. See Schuster & Propen, supra note 198 (quoting judge who 'lost [his] cool"); Judge
Naman Yells at Mom, supranote 196.
382. Johnny R.J. Fontaine, Shame, in OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 15, at 367-68
(shame is a painful, self-conscious emotion representing a negative perception of the self in
relation to unmet expectations, either those set by others or one's own "ideals and aspirations").
383. Bernard Rim6 et al., Social Sharing of Emotion: New Evidence and New Questions, in 9
EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 145, 163 (W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone eds., 1998)
(experiences of shame are particularly likely to be kept secret).
384. Batja Mesquita & Janxin Liu, The Cultural Psychology of Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 734, 744 (Shinobu Kitayama & Dov Cohen eds., 2007) (explaining
research showing that while in Western cultures shame tends to prompt withdrawal, in East
Asian cultures shame tends to be met with attempts at "self-improvement," sharing, and
development of "adaptive resources").
385. Vancouver Judge Yells at Convict, Then Apologizes, supra note 199 (judge shouted
"shut your damn mouth" at defendant, then apologized).
386. Bernard Rim6 et al., Long-lasting Cognitive and Social Consequences of Emotion: Social
Sharingand Rumination, 3 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 225, 238 (W. Stroebe and
M. Hewstone eds., 1992) (sharing of shameful experiences is often "more restricted to close and
intimate partners than [is] talking about other emotions").
387. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1535-36 n.295 ("[Tlhe most productive step for the judge
might be simply to notice the emotion, accept its existence, and disengage from any judgment of
it, including a negative self-judgment.").
388. O'Brien, supra note 141, at 253 ("Judging is one of the world's great jobs. We are
independent, relatively well compensated, and ... have box seats to the great game of life. The
knowledge that this is so puts the stresses of the job into proper perspective.").
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to act when angry, and how anger has worked to help or hinder their
3 90
judging. 38 9 These skills, fortunately, can be practiced and learned.
Anger management is a process that, while never perfected or
finished, should grow easier over time.
b. Special Issues in JudicialAnger Management
As this analysis reveals, judicial engagement with anger
promises to be as helpful as judicial engagement with emotion more
generally. It is important to emphasize that the model is not a rigid
checklist, nor could it be. The most critical element in judicial anger
management, as with all emotion regulation, is flexible responsiveness
to context.3 91 Considering three regulatory challenges unique to anger
helps demonstrate how this is so.
First, research involving the well-known "ultimatum game"
paradigm provides an instructive example.3 92 In a simple ultimatum
game, an experimental subject is told that a game partner will be
given a sum of money and will choose what portion of it to offer the
subject. If the subject accepts the partner's offer, she receives that
sum; if she rejects the offer, neither gets anything. Accepting any
offered amount therefore is economically advantageous. Subjects tend,
however, to reject offers they perceive to be unfair.393 Tellingly, they
disproportionately reject unfair offers when they believe the game
partner to be a human being (rather than a computer program), and
those rejections are associated with a strong response in brain areas
correlated with anger. 394 Such studies demonstrate that anger can
motivate principle-driven decisions, even when those decisions are
disadvantageous from the perspective of pure utility.3 95 That is, it
seems to take particular effort to override an anger response where
389. Id. at 251 ("I used to be an angry judge. The reasons for my anger were real enough.
Being a judge is stressful. For the past 10 years, though, I have been mellow. In deciding to
change, I first had to articulate the causes of my stress and then to determine which were within
my ability to minimize. (If some of my complaints sound petty, or unreasonably harsh, they in
fact were. That was part of my self-discovery.)").
390. Maroney, supranote 13, at 1522-23, 1555.
depends upon
391. Id. at 1510-11, 1514 ("[C]ompetent judicial emotion regulation ...
challenges.").
of
real-time
full
array
to
a
in
responding
judgment
flexibility and
392. See Martin A. Nowak et al., Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289
SCIENCE 1773, 1773 (2000) (describing ultimatum games).
393. Samuel M. McClure et al., Conflict Monitoring in Cognition-Emotion Competition, in
HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION, supra note 51, at 204, 211-12.

394.
opposed
anger as
395.

Id. The fact that humans are far more likely to be angered at another human, as
to an inanimate object (unless it is anthropomorphized), drives home the salience of
the driving force in enacting fairness judgments.
Id.
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doing so would confer a concrete benefit-such as some money over no
money-at the cost of a moral benefit.
The fact that anger has this characteristic, though, does not
dictate any particular response from the perspective of judicial
emotion regulation. Favoring principle-driven
decisions over
utilitarian ones is of obvious benefit where this is just the calculus we
expect of our judges. One might, for example, speculate that such a
process underlay the recent decision of a federal district judge to reject
what he assessed to be a patently unfair settlement proposal between
the Securities and Exchange Commission and Citigroup. 396 While
accepting the settlement would have conferred some financial benefit
to harmed parties, and would have saved the judge future time and
effort (not to mention criticism), anger may have enabled him to
assume those costs. If the deal was actually unfair, those costs are
worthwhile, as the parties now have an incentive to craft a fairer one.
In other instances, elevation of moral principle over practicality is not
what we ask of our judges. If, for example, a judge were presented
with a carefully brokered Alford plea 397 that would free three almostcertainly innocent inmates, we would not want her to reject it because
she is angry that the state stubbornly refuses to vacate the
convictions. 398 The deal may be unfair, but so too is the consequence of
rejecting it. 399 If the inmates are competent they should be the ones to
make that choice, given that they would be the ones to bear the costs.

396. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) ("[Ihe Court concludes, regretfully, that the proposed Consent Judgment is neither fair,
nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public interest."). Interestingly, several workshop
participants reacted to this speculation as if it were insulting to the judge in question, the Hon.
Jed Rakoff. The point here is quite the opposite: that if Judge Rakoff felt angry at the parties,
such anger was likely to have been both appropriate and helpful. Such reactions by the workshop
participants demonstrate the persistence of stigma associated with judicial emotion.
397. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (finding constitutional the entry of a guilty
plea from a defendant who protests his innocence).
398. This example is drawn from the case of the 'Vest Memphis Three." See Campbell
Robertson, Deal Frees 'West Memphis Three" in Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011, at Al
(describing the case). One may be tempted to say the judge should use that anger to motivate an
act of courage in dismissing the charges himself, but in many jurisdictions-including
Arkansas-he may lack that authority, see Josephine Linker Hart & Guilford M. Dudley,
Available Post-TrialRelief After a State Criminal Conviction When Newly Discovered Evidence
Establishes "ActualInnocence," 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 629 (2000), meaning he has the
choice of taking the Alford plea or consigning the inmates to continued incarceration.
399. WEST OF MEMPHIS (Fearless Films 2012) (documentary showing path to the Alford
pleas, as well as hearing in which pleas entered, despite one defendant's reluctance to take any
action suggesting responsibility; quoting that defendant's friend as saying, "this deal sucks," but
showing he took it in order to free co-defendant from death row).
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We therefore would expect the judge to find a different manner in
400
which to channel her anger.
Second, other aspects of anger that affect its regulation profile
similarly point to the importance of context. Because of anger's strong
tendency to motivate and fuel approach, it may take particular effort
to halt its physical concomitants. These tendencies are suited perfectly
to some situations, terribly to others. If a lawyer begins to make a
wildly improper argument in front of the jury, the judge may need to
react quickly and forcefully to forestall a mistrial-she may need to
raise her voice, smack the bench, point at the lawyer to get his
attention, and force him immediately to stop talking. In other
instances she will have (or can create) time and space within which to
choose a different reaction. 40 1 Similarly, anger's certainty renders the
processes of cognitive reappraisal less accessible and more effortful.
Avoiding reappraisal prevents waffling, which confers a distinct
advantage in some situations. 402 But other situations call for
deliberation and introspection, or even aggressive skepticism about
one's initial conclusions, even if the judge is facing criticism as a
"waffler" and is under pressure to reach a fast conclusion.
Third and finally, anger disclosure creates special dangers.
Though disclosure of other emotions-say, sadness-has been shown
to not reduce emotional experience, 4 3 anger disclosure actually has
4°4
Despite the folk wisdom underlying
been shown to increase it.
primal scream therapy, anger often is not diffused by letting it out, for
example, by "venting."40 5 This holds true for various forms of anger
disclosure, including both spontaneous expression (like shouting at a

400. The point here is not to assert, as a matter of fact, that Judge Jed Rakoff was in fact
angry at Citigroup and the SEC, or that the judge in the West Memphis cases was angry at
Arkansas state officials. This may be true, but the larger point is that these cases show the
distinction between situations in which anger could either support or not support rejection of a
deal, highlighting the importance of the precise legal context and the interests at stake.
401. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1584 n.287 ("[A] retired judge . . . reported that he did
sometimes walk out of his courtroom if something happened to make him 'really upset.' He would
take some time to calm down and think, then walk back in and respond to whatever had
happened.").
402. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 132 ("[A]nger can buffer decision makers from
indecision, risk aversion and over analysis"); O'Brien, supra note 141, at 251 ("[M]ost decisions
from the bench must be made without benefit of preparation, reflection, or consultation.").
403. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1523. The primary benefits of emotion disclosure are
increased access to resources such as constructive feedback and social support.
404. Brad J. Bushman, Does Venting Anger Feed or Extinguish the Flame? Catharsis,
Rumination, Distraction,Anger, and Aggressive Responding, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 724, 724-31 (2002).
405. Id. at 725-26, 729-30 (marshaling empirical evidence against "catharsis theory" of
anger venting).
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lawyer in court), informal disclosure (like talking with a spouse), and
carefully planned communications (like publishing a fiery dissent).
Further, contrary to popular belief, anger is often experienced as
hedonically enjoyable, specifically when one is anticipating
confronting, defeating, or otherwise getting back at the person at
whom one is angry. 406 This phenomenon raises the distinct danger
that judges who express anger may come to enjoy it, including the
sense of power it generates, and may become progressively less
selective in allowing its expression. Further, making anger known can
be destructive in a way that showing other emotions, like sadness,
generally cannot. The poisonous effect of the Boggs dissent in the
Sixth Circuit affirmative action case, for example, or the interpersonal
rancor brought on by performing the biting satirical song about Judge
McBryde, is extraordinarily difficult to repair.
These realities do not provide a reason for judges to not express
or discuss anger. They do, however, mean that anger expression and
disclosure are to be treated with far greater care than other forms of
disclosure. Because they will not lessen the feeling, such steps should
be designed to serve another purpose, such as processing a given
anger trigger's basis or strategizing future responses. More than with
other emotions, private disclosures often may be preferable to public
ones. Moreover, it will be more important for judges to allow
themselves time-even a moment-to choose their anger expressions
carefully, to be sure that expression serves a prosocial purpose rather
407
than an antisocial one.
Regulating emotion in light of these three special features of
anger requires the judge to make a great many distinctions-between
situations in which moral concerns do or do not predominate over
utilitarian ones, in which quick, decisive action is or is not called for,
and in which disclosing anger will or will not be prosocial. Making
those distinctions necessarily depends on context, substance, and
particulars. It depends, in other words, on reasoned analysis and selfreflection, tasks that rest in the nonalgorithmic mental processes of
human judges.

406. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 129-31.
407. Maroney, supra note 13, at 1530 n.287 (describing how one judge would buy himself
such time by leaving the courtroom momentarily); see also supra notes 379-88 and
accompanying text (giving examples of prosocial uses of anger disclosure).
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C. The New Model of JudicialAnger, Encapsulated
This Part has proposed a new model for judicial anger, that of
the righteously angry judge. The model is rooted in the core themes of
anger itself-a judgment that a rational agent has committed an
unwarranted wrongdoing, which generates a desire to affix blame and
assign punishment, and facilitates action to carry out that desire. It
may be encapsulated as follows.
Righteous judicial anger is, first, based on an accurate
perception of reality. It is responsive to actual, not imagined, acts.
Those acts must have been committed by persons who had some
meaningful level of choice, and must have caused real harms, not
ephemeral or insignificant ones. The righteously angry judge strives to
be as open as possible to accurate perception of these elements, to be
diligent in her search for truth, and to prevent anger from coloring her
view or blocking her ability to update information.
Second, righteous judicial anger is relevant. It bears on issues
properly before the judge and sheds light on how those issues should
be evaluated. The righteously angry judge strives to perceive the
causes of her anger-whether, for example, it reflects the seriousness
of an attorney's defiance of court orders, or whether it stems from that
attorney's consistently abrupt manner or an unrelated insult suffered
earlier in the day. If the anger is irrelevant, or only marginally
relevant, the judge seeks to ground her actions in other factors.
Third, righteous judicial anger reflects beliefs and values that
are worthy of a judge in a democratic society. The righteously angry
judge seeks to avoid anger at attorneys, witnesses, colleagues, and
parties for taking actions they have a right, or even an obligation, to
take. She seeks to do so even though such actions might be highly
irritating; entail acts that are oppositional to the judge and her
decisions; open her to the possibility of criticism and reversal; make
her work significantly harder; and (in the case of judicial colleagues)
embody substantive judgments she believes to be incorrect or harmful.
The worthiness of the beliefs and values underlying judicial anger is
at its peak where they reflect widely shared moral sentiments of
harm, culpability, and shared community. The righteously angry
judge also seeks to avoid contempt, as that emotion reflects an
unwarranted claim of superiority.
Righteous judicial anger not only is accurate, relevant, and
reflective of good values, it also is experienced and expressed in an
appropriate way. The righteously angry judge is aware of both the
benefits and dangers of anger, and seeks to maximize the former and
minimize the latter. She seeks to draw on anger's certainty and power
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when justice requires her to make fast, difficult, even risky, decisions,
and to resist its pull where the situation merits greater scrutiny and
caution. She interrogates her punitive impulses to see if they are well
grounded and commensurate to the harm. She considers the impact on
others of expressing her anger, and seeks to embody only those
reactions as will further some legitimate interest-such as stopping
destructive behavior, broadcasting authority, or channeling society's
moral messages.
Finally, righteous judicial anger is enabled by strong emotionregulation skills, which can be learned and must be regularly
practiced. The righteously angry judge seeks to prepare realistically
for anger, for it is certain to come; to respond thoughtfully to anger,
for she may be able to rethink the situation or select a different
response to it; and to integrate anger into her behavior and
decisionmaking, by making use of it when it is righteous and by
finding other outlets-such as private disclosure to a trusted
colleague-when it is not. The judge must not deny or suppress her
anger. Rather, she must face it honestly and engage with it closely.
She must also accept that she is fallible. She will make mistakes,
allow anger to bleed from one situation to another, value things like
her pride more than she ought, and indulge in displays she wishes she
had not. The righteously angry judge faces these failings and seeks to
learn from them.
When judicial anger has all these characteristics, feeling and
expressing it serves the ends of justice-indeed, in the Aristotelian
view it is justice. As the Greek tradition would hold, when "law itself
408
is angry," so too should be the judge.
CONCLUSION

As this Article has shown, judicial anger is inevitable, and its
manifestation both frequent and obvious. We cannot get away with
ignoring it. Interestingly, the Article also has shown that despite the
historical party line against any judicial experience or expression of
emotion, anger escapes blanket condemnation in practice. The close
look shows why anger would be treated specially: in the real world,
people in contact with law often act in ways that would make any
reasonable person-including a reasonable judge-angry. Fellow
judges are reluctant to impose on others feeling rules they could not
possibly live up to themselves. Nor should they live up to such a
standard. Courts' reluctance to condemn judicial anger is deepened by
408. Potegal & Novaco, supra note 8, at 18.
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a strong sense that it is sometimes warranted, such that failing to feel
it would be suspect. If a judge were to feel entirely unmoved by lying,
scheming, derailing legal proceedings, and harming others for no
reason, we might question whether she had lost touch with reality in
some fundamental, career-ending way. As Robert C. Solomon, the
eminent contemporary philosopher of the emotions, has written, we
cannot "have a sense of justice without the capacity and willingness to
409
be personally outraged."
On the other hand, even though we cannot look away from
judicial anger, we might sometimes wish we could. Angry judges
scream and flail about; they threaten and insult lawyers, parties, and
one another; in the most extreme instances, they physically attack.
Just as the absence of anger seems fundamentally at odds with our
aspirations for judges, unbounded anger does as well. While the
YouTube-viewing or Judge Judy-loving public might consume such
incidents with glee, those who care deeply about justice and its image
cannot help but wince.
While adherence to the ideal of dispassionate judging places us
on record as Stoics, then, reality has made us accidental Aristotelians.
Law is of two minds about judicial anger for good reason. 4 10 Our legal
culture simply cannot eschew judicial anger, any more than it could
applaud all its iterations. We have no choice but to ask whether it
stems from good reasons and is felt in the right way.
However, because we have not come to this place deliberately
or transparently, our analyses tend to be shallow and undertheorized.
Indeed, it is typical in the case law for a reviewing court to recite the
evidence of anger, quote the general principles of cases creating a
generous buffer zone, and simply conclude that the anger was (or, far
less frequently, was not) within the buffer. Just as often, courts dodge
the issue entirely-for example, by quickly characterizing the display
as harmless error. Popular assessments of judicial anger are even less
coherent, as they tend to swing on whose ox is being gored. This
Article has demonstrated that our evaluation can be more disciplined
and principled. By focusing tightly on questions of justification and
manifestation, we can test judicial anger for righteousness.

409. SOLOMON, supra note 64, at 42 (" '[Niegative' emotions" such as "outrage" have "an
essential place in the cultivation of justice."); id. at 243 ("Our sense of justice is not just the
product of New Age sentiments but a dynamic engagement in a world which we ourselves know
to be often offensive and unfair ...a world we accordingly resent and act to change.").
410. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 58, at 132 (anger might take a decisionmaker in a bad
direction sometimes, a good direction in others); Peters et al., supra note 312, at 83 (Emotion
"can have frightening effects on decision making," but also can assist "decision makers to
integrate disparate information and to make sense out of a complex world.").
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We should entertain no illusions that this will be easy. Judges
will not find it easy to feel only righteous anger, nor will those of us
who judge the judges find it easy to diagnose righteousness. Indeed,
we should expect these tasks to be hard. 411 This is particularly so asdespite a shared moral baseline-we are unlikely ever to be in true
consensus as to the normative values underlying all instances of
judicial anger. As Aristotle wrote:
[I]t is not an easy task to delineate how, at whom, at what, and for how long one should
anger, nor at what point justifiable anger turns to unjustifiable. He who swerves a bit
toward excess of anger is not to be blamed[, but] [h]ow far and4 1how
much one has to
2
swerve before he becomes... blameworthy is not easy to specify.

Faced with this difficulty, we need not rely on vague intuitions
or deal with anger episodes as a disconnected series of one-offs. The
model set forth in this Article provides us with theoretical tools with
which to imagine righteous judicial anger and practical tools with
which to achieve it. Except in extreme circumstances, and there will
be some, judges who fall short of this ideal merit not condemnation
but guidance. Righteously angry judges, in contrast, merit our
approval and thanks.

411.
Aristotle
purpose,
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Tiedens, supra note 58, at 132 ("[A]ngry decision makers may then, as
long ago, have a difficult time being angry at the right time, for the right
right way.").
AN EMOTION?, supra note 74, at 51 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN

